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Abstract
This dissertation introduces a general framework modeling common rating
processes in order to aggregate rating information stemming from a variety
of raters or rating sources. Ratings play an increasingly important role in
our life. They are used to evaluate a variety of objects and activities all over
the world. Here we apply our model framework to two different “ratings”,
the credit ratings and the bookmakers odds. Whereas credit ratings repre-
sent the evaluation of credit customers or firms by banks or external rating
agencies, bookmakers odds are prospective ratings of the performance of the
participating players or teams in a sports competition. Despite the fact that
these ratings are used in different kind of areas, both rating systems have a
very similar underlying rating process. In both rating processes each rater
estimates an underlying numerical variable which represent a probability or
is directly related to a probability. In the case of credit ratings this proba-
bility is the probability of default (PD) of a credit customer or a firm and
in the case of bookmakers odds this probability is the probability of winning
a specific sports competition. The proposed model framework is then used
to solve the aggregation problem of the two rating processes for different ap-
plications yielding different model specifications. Finally, the model results
are used to validate the different underlying rating systems as well as for
forecasting.
Keywords: Credit ratings, bookmakers odds, consensus, agreement.
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Zusammenfassung
Diese Arbeit stellt eine generelle Methode zur Modellierung von bekannten
Ratingprozessen dar. Das Ziel ist dabei die Ratinginformation von ver-
schiedenen Ratern oder Ratingquellen zu aggregieren. Ratings spiel heutzu-
tage eine immer wichtigere Rolle. Diese werden rund um den ganzen Globus
genutzt um Dinge und Aktivita¨ten zu evaluieren und zu bewerten. Im
Speziellen, wenden wir hier die vorgestellte Methode auf zwei verschiedene
Ratings, den Kreditratings und den Buchmacherquoten an. Wa¨hrend bei
Kreditratings Banken oder exterene Ratingagenturen Kreditnehmer oder Fir-
men bewerten, stellen Buchmacherquoten zuku¨nftige Erwartungen der Buch-
macher u¨ber die Leistungen von Teilnehmern eines Sporttuniers dar. Im
Gegensatz dazu, dass diese Ratings in verschiedenen Anwendungsgebieten
verwendet werden, haben beide Ratingsysteme einen sehr a¨hnlichen zugrun-
deliegenden Ratingprozess. Bei beiden Ratingprozessen scha¨tzt jeder Rater
eine zugrundeliegende numerische Variable welche eine Wahrscheinlichkeit
repra¨sentiert. Im Falle der Kreditratings ist diese Wahrscheinlichkeit die Aus-
fallswahrscheinlichkeit eines Kreditnehmers oder einer Firma und im Falle
der Wettquoten die Gewinnwahrscheinlichkeit ein spezielles Sporttunier zu
gewinnen. Das hier vorgeschlagene Model wird verwendet um das Aggre-
gationsproblem fu¨r diese beiden Ratingprozesse und fu¨r verschiedene An-
wendungen, welche zu verschiedenen Modelspezifikationen fu¨hren, zu lo¨sen.
Die Modelergebnisse werden danach genutzt um die zugrundeliegenden Rat-
ingsysteme zu validieren, sowie um Vorhersagen zu machen.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This dissertation focuses on two common rating instruments, the credit rat-
ings and the bookmakers odds. Analyzing credit ratings as well as their
underlying process have been among the most active areas of recent financial
research. The analysis of the betting market has also been of increasing inter-
est in the recent economic and sports research. Nevertheless, for these kinds
of ratings the literature do not provide a viable methodology to aggregate
rating information stemming from different raters/rating sources.
We first motivate the application of credit ratings in Section 1.1. Section 1.2
explains the role of bookmakers odds as sports ratings. Section 1.3 summa-
rizes the literature about consensus and agreement, the measures which are
needed to solve the aggregation problem. Section 1.4 gives an overview of
this dissertation.
1.1 Credit ratings
Credit ratings are one of the most important ratings all over the world. They
are used to evaluate the creditworthiness of firms or credit customers. Due
to the new regulatory Basel II framework for financial institutions (Bank
for International Settlements, 2004) and the subprime crisis along with the
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subsequent financial crisis (Rousseau, 2009) the role of credit rating processes,
also called credit rating systems has increased.
There are two major parties providing credit ratings, financial institutions
(e.g., banks) and external rating agencies. According to the new regulatory
Basel II framework banks have several incentives to make use of internal
rating systems to estimate risk parameters which are the essential input to
calculate their regulatory capital requirements (Bank for International Set-
tlements, 2004). Since modern credit risk pricing applies individual risk
parameters, like rating implied default probabilities, the credit ratings of the
big three external rating agencies Standard&Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch play
nowadays an even more prominent role in financial regulations. All big three
rating agencies provide ordinal ratings, but they use different rating systems
with different granularity as well as different labels (typically, a combination
of letters, numbers and/or modifiers). What makes credit ratings compa-
rable is the fact, that in the view of the agencies, likelihood of default is
the centerpiece of creditworthiness and therefore, consistent with the goal
of an ordinal rating scale, issuers with a lower rating should have a higher
probability of default than issuers with a high rating (Coughlin et al., 2009;
Erlenmaier, 2006; Cantor and Packer, 1997). There is a growing literature on
analysis of the external rating agencies. Krahnen and Weber (2001) present
a comprehensive framework for evaluating the quality of standard rating sys-
tems and present several principles that ought to be met by an appropriate
rating process. Moon and Stotsky (1993) examine the determinants of mu-
nicipal bond ratings for Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s. Stolper (2009)
studies a principal–agent problem in which a regulator approves credit rating
agencies and derives an approval scheme which induces rating agencies to as-
sign correct ratings. Altman and Rijken (2004) give a model for dealing the
problem of rating stability of the agencies. Several other academic studies
have examined differences in the rating outcomes of rating agencies for a set
of issuers (Jewell and Linvingston, 2002; Cantor and Packer, 1995).
Along with the increasing role of rating processes, the validation of credit rat-
ing systems has become an important field of research (Krahnen and Weber,
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2001; Crouhy et al., 2001). Traditional methods of validating credit rating
systems focus primarily on the discriminatory power, i.e., the ability to ex
ante distinguish between defaulting and non-defaulting obligors. Among the
best-known methods of this type are analyses based on the Accuracy Ratio
and the Receiver Operating Characteristic (e.g., Bank for International Set-
tlements, 2005). Unfortunately, these methods do not provide any conclusive
information about the accuracy of the PD estimates. Consider a hypothetical
rating system which systematically underestimates the true PDs by one half.
Obviously, such a rating system, though remarkably inaccurate, has maxi-
mal theoretical discriminatory power. On the other hand, in a population of
obligors with identical PDs even a perfectly accurate PD estimation will show
zero discriminatory power. Recent studies also deal with the shortcomings of
the use of these concepts for rating validation (e.g., Lingo and Winkler, 2008).
As pointed out by the regulatory bodies (Bank for International Settlements,
2005), validation methods have to aim at directly assessing the calibration
quality, i.e., the accuracy and reliability of PD estimates (e.g., Stein, 2002).
In contrast to backtesting methods where ex ante estimates are compared to
ex post realizations our general model framework is based on the existence
of contemporaneous ratings for the same obligor provided by different rating
sources. Hornik et al. (2007) call such a dataset multi-rater panel. Such a
benchmarking approach is particularly helpful when sufficient default obser-
vations are not available or competing rating systems are to be compared
(for a discussion of benchmarking approaches see Bank for International Set-
tlements, 2005; Hornik et al., 2007).
1.2 Bookmakers odds
In addition to credit ratings, we apply our general model framework to a spe-
cific kind of sport ratings, bookmakers odds. Sport ratings or rankings are
typically derived by suitably aggregating the competitors’ previous perfor-
mances and are often found to provide predictive power in forecasting tasks.
Boulier and Stekler (1999) show that rankings provide forcasting informa-
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tion for basketball tournaments and tennis matches. Lebovic and Sigelman
(2001) analyze the predictive accuracy of college football rankings. Suzuki
and Ohmori (2008) use the FIFA/Coca Cola World rating (Fe´de´ration In-
ternationale de Football Association, 2008), one of the most popular rating
system in soccer, as a forecasting tool for the last four FIFA World Cups
(1994, 1998, 2002, 2006). In addition, Dyte and Clarke (2000) use the FIFA
ratings to predict the distribution of scores in international soccer matches.
Another popular rating system is the Elo rating system, originally developed
to calculate the relative skills of chess players (e.g., Elo, 2008), which has sub-
sequently also been applied to various other sports including soccer. Song
et al. (2009) apply it as one method to forecast the winner of single American
Football games. Edmans et al. (2007) select important soccer games based
on the World Football Elo Ratings.
Bookmakers odds represent a rather different type of rating compared to the
methods above. In the course of growing popularity of online sports betting,
the analysis of betting markets has been receiving increased interest, often
focusing on two types of analyses: (1) testing the forecasting power of the
bookmakers, and (2) testing the efficiency of the betting market. The book-
makers publish odds for a variety of players and teams for winning sports
competitions and tournaments. Based on the bookmakers’ expert judgments
(which typically include, but are not limited to, knowledge about past per-
formances) the odds reflect expected outcomes in a particular competition
where the bookmakers have strong economic incentives to rate the competi-
tors correctly. A bias (in either direction, too good or too bad) will cost them
money, or, in other words, will reduce their profits. Hence, bookmakers can
be seen as experts in the matter of sports rating (see Pope and Peel, 1989)
and are likely to provide good predictions (Forrest and Simmons, 2000). This
is confirmed by various empirical studies in which fixed odds are found to be
an efficient forecasting instrument for the outcome of single matches (e.g.,
Vlastakis et al., 2009; Spann and Skiera, 2009; Song et al., 2007; Forrest
et al., 2005b; Dixon and Pope, 2004; Boulier and Stekler, 2003).
One advantage of employing bookmakers odds is that winning probabilities
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for the corresponding competition can be derived easily while this is not
straightforward for many of the ability ratings. However, if abilities are mea-
sured on a ratio scale (or can be transformed to such), winning probabilities
for pairwise matches can be derived using the approach of the Bradley and
Terry (1952) model. Notable in this respect is the Elo rating from which
pairwise winning probabilities for single matches can be obtained (e.g., Ste-
fani and Pollard, 2007; Edmans et al., 2007). Thus, when the competition of
interest is a single match, forecasts based on ability ratings and bookmakers
odds can be compared easily. The same is not true if the competition is a
more complex tournament for which the bookmakers odds, by their prospec-
tive nature, can include additional effects such as group draws or seedings.
1.3 Consensus information and agreement
By analyzing the two common rating processes (described above) we are in-
terested in the aggregated rating information as well as the agreement across
different forecasters, here raters. Therefore, a measure of “consensus” and a
measure of “agreement” are needed. Zarnowitz and Lambros (1987) define
“consensus” as the degree of agreement among point predictions aimed at
the same target by different individuals and “uncertainty” as the diffuseness
of the corresponding probability distributions. The “consensus” measure can
be computed as the median (Su and Su, 1975) or the mean of all the fore-
casts in the sample (Zarnowitz and Lambros, 1987). In order to measure
“uncertainty” or “disagreement” the standard deviations of the predictive
probability distributions could be used (e.g, Clements, 2008; Zarnowitz and
Lambros, 1987; Lahiri and Teigland, 1987). These strategies are applied to
sports competitions by Song et al. (2009, 2007). There is no similar applica-
tion to credit ratings. Alternative strategies for the aggregation of forecasts
are discussed by Kolb and Stekler (1996); Schnader and Stekler (1991).
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1.4 Overview of the dissertation
The general aim of this dissertation is to solve the aggregation problem of
rating information stemming from a variety of raters or rating sources. In
particular, we are interested in the consensus and the agreement informa-
tion across raters/rating sources. This problem represents a major research
issue for different rating areas. In this dissertation we solve this problem
for two common rating processes. These two processes are the credit rat-
ing process where financial institutions or external rating agencies evaluate
credit customers or firms and the bookmakers’ evaluations of teams’ or play-
ers’ performances in a sports competition. In order to obtain consensus as
well as (dis)agreement information across different raters/rating sources, we
investigate a general model framework modeling these two common rating
processes.
Chapter 2 presents a general mixed-effects model framework (e.g., Pinheiro
and Bates, 2000) to obtain consensus as well as (dis)agreement information
across raters/rating sources. The notation of this class of model is introduced
and the estimation within a frequentist maximum likelihood setting or using
Bayesian estimation techniques is described. Furthermore, we specify the
different applications as well as the variety of research questions which are
answered in the following two chapters.
In Chapter 3 we extend our general model framework into a static latent vari-
able model for the probability of default (PD) of firms or credit customers
using PD rating information stemming from a variety of raters of only one
time point (see Hornik et al., 2008, 2010) and into a dynamic latent variable
model for ordinal ratings using rating information stemming from a variety
of raters over a specific time period (see Gru¨n et al., 2010). For both ap-
plications we derive consensus ratings as well as information about the rater
agreement to validate the underlying rating processes.
Chapter 4 applies the general model framework to bookmakers odds and
investigate a general model specification for bookmakers odds in order to
forecast the outcome and analyze the bookmakers agreement of three differ-
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ent sport tournaments, the UEFA EURO 2008 (see Leitner et al., 2008a,b,
2010a), Wimbledon 2009 (see Leitner et al., 2009c,d), and the UEFA Cham-
pions League 2008/09 (see Leitner et al., 2009a,b, 2010b). For all applications
the forecasting power of the bookmaker consensus is compared to other rating
systems in ex post analysis.
Chapter 5 concludes this dissertation.
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Chapter 2
General Model framework
The basic assumption of our general model framework is that raters estimate
a numerical variable—representing information about the underlying rating
subject—in an internal rating process. Due to general informational asym-
metry between the rater and the rating subject the rater cannot estimate the
“true” numerical variable. This asymmetry can be due to limited access to
the existing information, such as incomplete information, or delayed obser-
vations of the driving factors. Generally, the modeler is entirely free in the
functional specification of the relationship between the estimation error and
the “true” numerical variable.
In our model the “true” numerical variable is taken as a latent vari-
able. Rating outcomes from different sources are treated as noisy estima-
tions/observations of this latent variable. A parametric specification of such
a model has to include the following components:
• The distribution of the latent variable,
• the formal relation by which the noise or error terms are linked to the
latent variable, and
• the distribution of the error terms.
The means and (co)variances of these distributions are the key outcome of
8
the model. The mean parameters indicate the rating bias, i.e., the expected
shift of the estimated numerical variable of a certain rating system compared
to the average numerical variable across all rating sources. The variance
parameters reflect the general size of undirected estimation errors, i.e., they
reflect the precision of the rating system. Finally, the covariances convey
information about potential error dependencies across rating systems.
Denoting the underlying numerical variable as the rating score `(rij(t)) of the
rating rij(t) of rating subject i by rater j at time t, the relationship between
the estimated rating score `(rij(t)) (estimated in an internal rating process
by rater j) and the latent rating score `(ri(t)) can be written as
`(rij(t)) = `(ri(t)) + ij(t), (2.1)
where ` is a suitable link function transforming the rating to the real axis so
that the error terms are related additively to the latent rating score.
This relationship builds our general model framework which can be used to
validate the different raters/rating sources by analyzing the rating errors and
to compute consensus information across all rating systems, which particu-
larly in the case of only partially available rating information, i.e., not for all
rating subjects rating observations by each rater or rating source is available,
is non trivial (see e.g., Cook et al., 1986, 2007). To the best of our knowledge
there is no viable methodology available to obtain consensus ratings for these
kinds of data sets. The estimation of consensus ratings is thus one of the
major contributions of this dissertation. The obtained consensus informa-
tion can be then used for forecasting issues. Deviations between observed
ratings and consensus ratings can be analyzed on an atomistic case by case
basis. Further, these differences can be aggregated on rating source or rating
subject levels, which can aid in detecting potential systematic patterns or
anomalies in rating behavior.
Estimation. In order to estimate the model parameters of the specific
models we employ standard maximum likelihood estimation (Lehmann and
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Casella, 1998) as well as Bayesian estimation techniques (Spiegelhalter et al.,
2002; Carlin and Louis, 2009).
Application. The general model framework (see above) offers a variety of
model specifications and can therefore be used for many different application.
We apply it to the following issues:
• A static latent variable model for PD estimation in order to validate
13 Austrian banks,
• a dynamic latent variable model for ordinal credit ratings in order to
validate the big three external credit rating agencies (Standard&Poor’s,
Moody’s and Fitch),
• a general model specification for bookmakers odds in order to forecast
the outcome and analyze the bookmakers agreement of the following
three sport tournaments
– UEFA EURO 2008,
– Wimbledon 2009, and
– UEFA Champions League 2008/09.
By obtaining consensus as well as (dis)agreement from the specific models we
can validate the different raters/rating sources as well as use the aggregated
information for forecasting issues. Whereas the applications on credit ratings
focus mainly on the validation of the raters, we use the consensus of the
bookmakers to predict the outcome of a tournament.
In particular, we try to find answers to the following research questions:
• Are there marked rating differences in the Austrian credit market across
banks?
• Are there marked rating differences in the Austrian credit market across
industries (or industry/bank combinations)?
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• Can some rating differences in the Austrian credit market be explained
by the obligors’ legal form or exposure size?
• Are there marked rating differences across the big three external credit
rating agencies (Standard&Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch)?
• Is there a relationship between the consensus ratings of the iTraxx
Europe companies and the real markets (e.g., the Dow Jones EURO
STOXX 50 index)?
• Is the consensus information across bookmakers a good forecast-
ing tool for the outcome of a specific sports tournament, like the
UEFA EURO 2008, Wimbledon 2009, and the UEFA Champions
League 2008/09?
• How is the (dis)agreement across bookmakers for a specific tournament,
like the UEFA Champions League 2008/09?
• Is there a relationship between the (dis)agreement across bookmakers
and some team-specific characteristics (e.g., the teams’ association)?
11
Chapter 3
Modeling credit ratings
Credit ratings, evaluating the creditworthiness of firms or credit customers
are usually recorded on an ordinal scale and thus are not directly usable
measures of the firm’s or credit customer’s default probability (Carey and
Hrycay, 2001). Due to Basel II, it is more and more common for raters, e.g.,
banks to estimate the probability of default (PD) directly and provide PD
ratings (Bank for International Settlements, 2004).
Here, we extend our general model framework (Equation 2.1) into a static
latent variable model for PD estimation using PD rating information stem-
ming from a variety of raters of only one time point (Section 3.1) and into
a dynamic latent variable model for ordinal ratings using rating information
stemming from a variety of raters over a specific time period (Section 3.2).
We derive consensus ratings as well as information about the rater agreement
to validate the underlying rating processes.
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3.1 A static latent variable model for PD es-
timation
3.1.1 Model specification
One of the most important credit risk parameters is the probability of de-
fault (PD) which is defined to measure the likelihood of the occurrence of a
default event for a certain obligor over a one year horizon. Modern credit
risk management is crucially based on the risk-adjusted pricing of loans and
other credit-risk contingent claims which again heavily relies on a valid and
accurate PD estimation methodology. The accuracy of PD estimates is of
particular importance for virtually all pricing models for structured credit
derivatives. While some pricing models need accurate measures of the aver-
age PD of a bond or loan portfolio as an input, some more advanced models
require the distribution of individual PDs of such a portfolio which imposes
even higher challenges on the validity of the estimation models.
Here, we use our general model framework (Equation 2.1) to assess the ac-
curacy of PD estimates. Therefore, the “true” PD is taken as the latent
variable. Rating outcomes from different sources (e.g., banks, rating tools,
or rating agencies) are treated as noisy observations of this latent variable,
because we assume that the raters cannot observe the “true” PD of the
obligor due to informational asymmetry between firm owners and debt hold-
ers which constitutes the cornerstone of modern corporate finance (e.g., Le-
land and Pyle, 1977; Berk and DeMarzo, 2007). Possible reasons for this
asymmetry are limited access to the existing information, such as incomplete
accounting information (Duffie and Lando, 2001), and delayed observations
of the driving risk factors (Guo et al., 2009).
The motivation for the specification used in this context builds on the main
concept of structural or firm value models (e.g., Merton, 1974; Lando, 2004).
The standard models assume the firm value to be the only driving factor of
credit risk and to follow a Geometric Brownian Motion. As a consequence,
an important stylized property of these models is that the probit of the PD
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is linear in the natural log of the firm value. Let Vi be the log asset value of
firm i and PDi its probability of default. The basic model of Merton (1974)
can be written as
PDi = Φ(−DDi), DDi = ai + biVi,
where Φ is the distribution function of the standard normal distribution, ai
and bi are constants independent of Vi, and DDi is the so-called distance
to default of firm i (Crosbie and Bohn, 2003; Bharath and Shumway, 2008).
Along the lines of Duffie and Lando (2001), we assume that the error in the
observation of the firm value is normal and additive to the log of the firm
value. This assumption can also be justified by the wide-spread use of struc-
tural models for PD estimation in the banking industry which have gained
additional importance by the introduction of the Basel II supervisory frame-
work. The most prominent industry model was developed by Moody’s KMV
(Crosbie and Bohn, 2003) and is used in several extensions and modifications
by many financial institutions. In this class of models the distance to default
is derived from stock market and accounting data and used as the key in-
put to the PD estimation. It thus seems natural to assume that erroneous
observations and incomplete information lead to normally distributed errors
which are additive to the distance to default.
The “estimate” PDij as derived by bank j for the true PD of firm i is thus
of the form
PDij = Φ(−DDi + ij)
where ij is the corresponding error (which depends on j in particular as
raters might have access to different information sets for firm i). Equivalently,
Φ−1(PDij) = −DDi + ij = Φ−1(PDi) + ij
A second important class of industry models estimate PDs based on a probit
(or logit) regression of observed default indicators on a set of risk charac-
teristics of the firm (e.g., Blume et al., 1998; Nickell et al., 2000). A linear
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combination of the risk characteristics of the firm where the resulting re-
gression coefficients are used as weights constitutes the rating score of the
firm. The PD estimate is then obtained by transforming the score to the
unit interval by the corresponding transformation. In the case of the probit
transformation this approach is fully consistent with our framework, because
the error term in the regression is normal and additive to the score.
Consolidating the Merton type and the regression approaches, we are led
to apply our general model framework (Equation 2.1) and relate the raters’
estimated (observed) PDs to the (unobservable) true PDs in the form
`(PDij) = `(PDi) + ij.
for a suitable (strictly monotonically increasing) link function ` mapping the
(0, 1) PD scale to (−∞,+∞). Via `, the PDs are mapped to corresponding
scores. On the score scale, the rating errors are modeled additively. Let Sij =
`(PDij) and Si = `(PDi) denote the observed and latent scores, respectively.
For Merton type models, ` = Φ−1 and Si = −DDi. Writing µij and σij denote
the mean and standard deviation of ij, respectively, the above latent trait
model can be written as
Sij = Si + µij + σijZij
where the standardized rating errors Zij = (ij−µij)/σij have mean zero and
unit variance. We prefer to think of PDi and hence the corresponding scores
Si as drawn randomly from an underlying obligor population, and assume
that rating errors are independent of the true PDs and that true PDs and
rating errors are i.i.d. across obligors. (Of course, these assumptions could
be relaxed if more involved probabilistic specifications are desired.) We thus
obtain a mixed-effects model (e.g., Pinheiro and Bates, 2000) for the observed
Sij where the latent true PD scores enter as random effects. We refer to this
model as the latent trait model for the multi-rater panel of PD estimates.
Given parametric models for the µij and σij and the distributions of true
PD scores and standardized rating errors, the latent trait model can be esti-
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mated using e.g. marginal maximum likelihood (provided that the marginal
distributions of the Sij, i.e., the convolutions of the true PD score and rating
error distributions, can be computed well enough), or Bayesian techniques.
A very simple parametric specification of the bias/variance structure of the
rating errors is µij = µj and σij = σj, in which case the rating errors would
be independent of the obligors and their characteristics (in particular, their
creditworthiness itself). We suggest the employment of flexible models of the
form
µij = µg(i),j, σij = σg(i),j,
where g(i) ∈ {1, . . . , G} is the group of obligor i, for a suitable grouping
of obligors relative to which raters exhibit homogeneous rating error char-
acteristics. Note that we use µ for the means of the rating errors and the
respective model parameters, with µij = E(ij) and µg,j the parameter for
group g and rater j. The σ notation is analogous. Such groups can e.g.
be defined by industry, obligor “type”, size, and legal form, or combinations
thereof. The importance of accounting for industry group effects in the anal-
ysis of creditworthiness patterns has e.g. been emphasized in Crouhy et al.
(2001).
As
E(Sij) = E(Si) + µg(i),j,
conditions relating the rating biases to the mean observed PD scores are re-
quired to ensure identifiability. More generally, note that common random
effects in the rating errors cannot be separated from the true PD scores. A
natural condition consistent with the interpretation as rating bias relative
to an underlying unbiased truth is
∑
j µg,j = 0, i.e., that the raters’ average
rating bias within each obligor group is zero. With this identifiability con-
straint, the marginal group effects in the means are absorbed into the means
of the latent scores, for which we shall employ the basic model E(Si) = νg(i)
consistent with the identifiability constraint. Possible models for the vari-
ances of the PD scores include var(Si) = τ
2 (constant for all obligors) or
var(Si) = τ
2
g(i) (constant for all obligors in the same group).
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With these specifications, the consensus score for obligor i is given by Sˆi, the
estimated random effect in the fitted mixed-effects model. Consensus PD
estimates are readily obtained by transforming the consensus scores back to
the PD scale using the inverse `−1 of the link function, i.e., as P̂Di = `−1(Sˆi).
Finally, residuals are the part of the observations unexplained by the model
and given by Sij − Sˆi− µˆij, the observed scores minus the estimated random
and fixed effects.
In what follows, we assume that true PD scores and rating errors have a
(multivariate) normal distribution. Possible extensions are discussed in Sec-
tion 3.1.3. With these assumptions, the latent trait model can be estimated
using standard software for mixed-effects models, provided that these allow
for sufficiently flexible specifications of the error covariance structure.
Our framework is applicable in the context of banking supervision and de-
velopment of rating models. Banking supervisors are interested in the pa-
rameters of the error terms in order to assess the calibration quality of the
internal rating system of a supervised bank. Supervisors might also be in-
terested in the consensus PD estimates for analyzing financial stability of
a banking system (see Elsinger et al., 2006). Finally, developers of rating
systems such as banks and rating agencies have a natural interest in com-
paring their outcomes to peers at different stages of the development. Note,
however, that as for any benchmarking method our model does only provide
information about the relative rather than the absolute rating errors since
actual default information is not incorporated.
The model presented here is related to other studies on benchmarking credit
rating systems (e.g., Hornik et al., 2007; Stein, 2002; Carey, 2001). In con-
trast to these contributions, our model explicitly proposes a probabilistic
framework which reflects the stochastic nature of the true PDs and the rat-
ing errors incurred in the process of PD estimation. This allows to directly
estimate parameters reflecting the calibration quality of rating systems and
derive consensus PD estimates consistent with the suggested framework.
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3.1.2 Application
Data Description
For the empirical example we employ a data set on rating information pro-
vided by Oesterreichische Nationalbank, the Austrian central bank. The data
contain rating information (one-year PD estimates) from 13 major Austrian
banks on 2090 obligors in September 2007 and cover a significant share of
the Austrian credit market. For each obligor, at least two PD estimates
are available. The number of co-ratings (occurrences of ratings of a single
obligor by two different banks) is 5460. In addition to the PD estimates we
have cross-sectional information about the obligors, like legal form, industry
affiliation and outstanding exposure. Table 3.1 reports descriptive statistics
of the data set.
Min. Median Max. Mean
Number of obligors per bank 70 182 1700 420
Number of ratings per obligor 2 2 11 2.5
Size of banks measured by 1.0 8.7 128.5 11.8
their total assets (in Euro billions)
Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics of the characteristics of the rating informa-
tion and the 13 Austrian banks in the data set.
Note that even the smallest bank has at least 70 obligors in common with
one or more of the other institutions. Apart from looking at the number of
co-ratings on a bank level, we also compute the number of co-ratings on an
obligor level. The median number of these co-ratings is 2, suggesting that
most obligors have business relations to only a small number of banks.
For a deeper analysis we group all obligors by their industry affiliation and
their legal form. Based on the NACE codes (European Commission, 2008)
we classify obligors to nine main industries. Table 3.2 shows the distribution
of the obligors across the industries.
Table 3.2 shows that the total numbers of co-ratings (5460) is not uniformly
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No. of No. of
Label Industry co-ratings co-ratings (%)
Manufac Manufacturing 938 17.2
Energy Energy & Environment 180 3.3
Constr Construction 184 3.4
Trading Trading 641 11.7
Finance Financial Intermediation 1737 31.8
RealEst Real Estate & Renting 754 13.8
Public Public Sector 344 6.3
Service Service 435 8.0
Private Private Individuals 247 4.5
Total 5460 100.0
Table 3.2: Distribution of the co-ratings of the 13 Austrian banks across
industries.
distributed across the nine industries, ranging from 180 co-ratings in Energy
& Environment (“Energy”) to 1737 co-ratings in Financial Intermediation
(“Finance”). With 13 banks and 9 industries there are 117 possible sub-
portfolios to be analyzed. However in 17 of these there are no observations.
In addition the obligors can be grouped with aspect to their legal form yield-
ing that 79.6% of the obligors are limited companies, 12.2% unlimited com-
panies, and 8.2% are private individuals.
Finally, we use information on the banks’ relative exposures against each
obligor. Relative exposure is measured as the outstanding amount against
the obligor expressed as a fraction of the total volume of outstanding loans
of a specific bank and serves as a rough indicator for the size of the obligor.
Results
This section describes the model selection process and the empirical results.
The general model class allows for many competing model specifications
based on the data structure (see Section 3.1.1). Our selection process yields
a model using the industry as grouping variable. We present bank and indus-
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try specific analyses based on rating biases and error variances derived from
this specification. Furthermore, we analyze the errors from the consensus
rating of this model on the obligor level based on exposure and legal form.
Model Selection and Parameter Estimates. Equation 2.1 in Section
3.1.1 describes a very general model class allowing for a variety of specifica-
tions for the means and variances of the normal distributions of the latent
PD scores and rating errors. We use parametric models which group obligors
based on the available co-variates (for the data set at hand, industry affil-
iation, legal form and exposure). For the error distributions, bank effects
as well as group/bank interaction terms are considered. We also investi-
gate models allowing for general correlation patterns between rating errors.
For each fitted model, we compute the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC)
and Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC, also known as Schwarz’s Bayesian
criterion). The best model is then selected based on these criteria.
The parameters of the mixed-effects models are estimated via maximum like-
lihood (e.g., Pinheiro and Bates, 2000) The best model found by the model
selection procedure uses industry affiliation as the sole grouping variable and
a single variance parameter PD score, and is given by
Sij = Si + µg(i),j + σg(i),jZij, Si ∼ N(νg(i), τ 2), (3.1)
where µg,j is the rating bias to the mean PD score of bank j for obligors in
industry g, σg,j is the standard deviation of the rating error of bank j for
obligors in industry g, and νg is the mean PD score in industry g. This model
forms the basis for further analysis. Note that the µ and σ parameters are
unestimable for industry/bank combinations with no observations.
We begin our analysis of the estimation results by showing the parameters
describing the distribution of the true latent scores. These are the industry
specific means νg and the standard deviation τ . For ease of interpretation we
additionally show the images under the inverse link function of the mean PD
scores for each industry and the respective one standard deviation intervals
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(see Table 3.3).
Industry νg Φ(νg) Φ(νg − τ ) Φ(νg + τ )
Manufac −2.542 55.1 17.7 151.1
Energy −2.993 13.8 3.8 44.2
Constr −2.448 71.8 23.8 190.9
Trading −2.375 87.7 29.8 227.5
Finance −3.256 5.6 1.5 19.2
RealEst −2.474 66.8 22.6 174.7
Public −3.330 4.3 1.1 15.1
Service −2.517 59.2 19.8 157.0
Private −2.296 108.4 40.0 267.4
Table 3.3: Industry specific means νg and PD intervals measured in basis
points (10−4). Intervals are obtained by applying the standard normal dis-
tribution to νg ± τ .
We infer from Table 3.3 that on an aggregate level the portfolio of our sample
banks might exhibit important differences in average credit quality across
industries ranging from 4.3 basis points (bp; one bp corresponds to 10−4)
measured in terms of PDs for public obligors to 108.4bp for private obligors.
Furthermore, a standard deviation τ of 0.357 on the score level yields intervals
of different width on the PD scale depending on the industry specific νg. E.g.,
for public obligors we obtain an interval ranging from 1.1bp to 15.1bp whereas
it is much wider among private obligors spanning from 40.0bp to 267.4bp.
Analyzing the rating biases, Table 3.4 shows the bank specific bias estimates
(µg,j). A number of conclusions can be drawn from this analysis. First
one might want to interpret the results from an aggregate bank specific per-
spective. Evidently, in columns 1 and 3 most parameter estimates show a
negative sign, whereas the opposite holds for column 13 with all estimates
being positive. Banks 1 and 3 thus seem to be too optimistic in their credit
assessment whereas bank 13 might exhibit an extremely conservative rating
behavior.
We also employ so-called relationship plots to visualize the estimated rating
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bias and error variance parameters. These plots visualize the relationship
between measurements of a quantitative variable (here: estimated model pa-
rameters) and the interaction of two qualitative factors (here: industry/bank
combinations). Each combination of factor levels is represented by a rectan-
gular cell shaded by gray values representing the corresponding measurement
values.
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Figure 3.1: Rating bias for bank/industry combinations µg,j of the 13 Aus-
trian banks. A dark cell represents a high absolute value, whereas a light cell
represents a very low absolute value. If the underlying value is negative, the
border of the cell is dotted instead of lined. In case of no observations the
bias cannot be estimated, hence the missing cells.
We can also use the industries to better understand the general tendency of
identified potential “outlier banks”. Bank 1 rather generally overestimates
credit quality relative to the other banks (particularly in the Energy, Trading,
and Real Estate industries). Bank 3 possibly overestimates the credit quality
for private individuals. Conversely, for bank 13 we note that it potentially
acts over-cautiously in the Construction industry.
One of the key strengths of our framework is its ability to estimate the
standard deviations of the bank specific errors and thus measure the precision
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of the respective rating systems. Table 3.5 contains the results and Figure 3.2
shows the corresponding relationship plot. The values range from 0.006 for
bank 8 for public obligors to a maximum of 0.612 observed for bank 12 for
private individuals indicating that the rating tool employed by this bank
might be inappropriate for this industry. From a bank-wide perspective
Figure 3.2 furthermore suggests that the level of precision is particularly
low for bank 3. We observe the highest standard deviation levels for the
Real Estate industry, indicating that the banks have particular difficulties
in accurately assessing the credit quality and suggesting that informational
asymmetries are rather pronounced in this industry.
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Figure 3.2: Standard deviations σg,j of the rating errors for bank/industry
combinations of the 13 Austrian banks. A dark cell represents a high absolute
value, whereas a light cell represents a very low absolute value. In case of no
observations the deviation can’t be estimated, hence the missing cells.
Consensus Rating and Residual Analysis. The calibration results of
the model presented in the previous section allows us to estimate a consensus
rating for each obligor (see Section 3.1.1). The consensus rating itself can be
used for many applications where deviations of individual raters or ratings
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from an aggregated rating is of interest, e.g., in banking supervision. In this
section, the consensus ratings are used to calculate residuals for each rating
which allows for a deeper economic analysis. The two variables not employed
for grouping in the model specification, i.e., legal form and exposure, are used
in this section to illustrate possible further analysis.
l
l
l
l
l
ll
Limited Unlimited
−
1.
0
−
0.
5
0.
0
0.
5
1.
0
di
ff
Bank 1
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
Limited Unlimited
−
1.
0
−
0.
5
0.
0
0.
5
1.
0
di
ff
Bank 2
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
Limited Unlimited
−
1.
0
−
0.
5
0.
0
0.
5
1.
0
di
ff
Bank 3
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
lll
l
l
l
Limited Unlimited
−
1.
0
−
0.
5
0.
0
0.
5
1.
0
di
ff
Bank 4
l
l
l
ll
l
ll
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
Limited Unlimited
−
1.
0
−
0.
5
0.
0
0.
5
1.
0
di
ff
Bank 5
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
Limited Unlimited
−
1.
0
−
0.
5
0.
0
0.
5
1.
0
di
ff
Bank 6
l
lll
l
l
l
l
Limited Unlimited
−
1.
0
−
0.
5
0.
0
0.
5
1.
0
di
ff
Bank 7
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
Limited Unlimited
−
1.
0
−
0.
5
0.
0
0.
5
1.
0
di
ff
Bank 8
l
l
l
l
l
l
Limited Unlimited
−
1.
0
−
0.
5
0.
0
0.
5
1.
0
di
ff
Bank 9
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
Limited Unlimited
−
1.
0
−
0.
5
0.
0
0.
5
1.
0
di
ff
Bank 10
ll
l
l
l
l
ll
ll
l
Limited Unlimited
−
1.
0
−
0.
5
0.
0
0.
5
1.
0
di
ff
Bank 11
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
Limited Unlimited
−
1.
0
−
0.
5
0.
0
0.
5
1.
0
di
ff
Bank 12
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
Limited Unlimited
−
1.
0
−
0.
5
0.
0
0.
5
1.
0
di
ff
Bank 13
Figure 3.3: Residual analysis for all 13 banks across the legal forms: limited
and unlimited companies.
Figure 3.3 presents the residuals for each bank for corporate obligors with
limited and unlimited liability. Based on this representation we analyze the
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locations and dispersions of the residuals on the bank level. In general,
the medians of the residuals are small in absolute terms and we find no
structural effect over all banks, i.e., there is no general difference in terms of
the median residuals between limited and unlimited liability obligors. On a
bank specific level we find residual medians that markedly differ between the
two legal forms, e.g., for banks 2 and 13. Bank 2 assigns favorable ratings
for limited liability obligors and vice versa for bank 13. We also see no
systematic difference in residual dispersion between limited and unlimited
corporates, but note that individual banks exhibit rather marked levels of
residual dispersion for a specific legal form. Such results could be particularly
interesting for supervisors, as it might allow to identify problem areas of
individual banks.
As a second illustrative example, we analyze the residuals with respect to
the relative exposure size of the obligors. The relative exposure shows the
importance of an obligor for the bank. Thus we are particularly interested
to detect obligors with large relative exposures and too favorable ratings.
Figure 3.4 shows residuals against relative exposures for two selected banks
(bank 13 and bank 8). Bank 13 rates two obligors (marked in Figure 3.4)
with high relative exposures (more than 2.5% of the total exposure) rather
too favorable relative to the market consensus. For bank 8, however, we
cannot find comparable outliers. Such an outlier analysis is very important,
as it might help supervisors to identify problem loans which have a significant
size within a bank’s credit portfolio.
3.1.3 Discussion
In this section we propose a new probabilistic framework for credit rating
model validation in a multi-rater setup, i.e., in situations where PD estimates
from different sources for the same obligors are available. In our model the
unobservable true PD of all obligors is treated as a latent variable and raters
obtain only noisy observations of the latent true PD. In the general framework
three ingredients are to be specified: The distribution of the latent PD, the
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Figure 3.4: Residual analysis for two banks (bank 13 and bank 8) across the
relative exposure.
distribution of the error terms, and a suitable link function which transforms
the PD to the real axis such that the error terms are additive. Building
on the theory of structural credit risk models we propose a specification
with normal error terms which uses the probit as a link function. In an
empirical example we estimate suitable parametrizations of this model and
present results on parameter estimates and possible economic interpretation.
Our framework has a variety of potential applications: Banking supervisors
might be interested in parameters of the error terms to assess the calibration
quality of bank internal rating systems. Developers of rating systems such
as banks and rating agencies have a natural interest in benchmarking their
rating outcomes to competing models.
Results of benchmarking analyses always need to be assessed relative to the
representativity of the available data panel. In our case, it obviously needs to
be ensured that raters in the panel follow mutually distinct rating procedures.
Data in the panel must be measurements of the same underlying entity. In
the application framework of this section, banks must supply ratings for the
same underlying notion of obligor creditworthiness, which in our case are one-
year issuer-specific point-in-time probabilities of default. If different notions
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are used, e.g. when trying to incorporate ordinal ratings of creditworthiness
such as those provided by the major rating agencies, one could attempt to
map these to their one-year PD equivalents. In this case, rating errors will
include the corresponding mapping errors.
The suggested framework for modeling multi-rater panels of PD estimates is
very general and allows for a variety of possible enhancements. We already
indicated the possibility of including additional terms in the parametric spec-
ifications of the means and variances of the PD scores and rating errors, or
allowing for correlations of rating errors across raters (again, note that a
common error “factor” is indistinguishable from the latent PD score). In
addition, one could aim at employing more flexible models for the distribu-
tions of the PD scores or rating errors, e.g., via suitable mixtures of normals.
One could also try to model potential censoring effects mandated by regula-
tory frameworks. E.g., Paragraph 331 of Bank for International Settlements
(2004) states that “the PD for retail exposures is the greater of the one-year
PD associated with the internal borrower grade to which the pool of retail
exposures is assigned or 0.03%”, suggesting to enhance Equation 2.1 along
the lines of Sij = max(Si+ ij, ci) with known obligor-specific cutoffs ci. One
should note, however, that in many applications co-rating patterns are rather
sparse, limiting the flexibility of statistical models which can be inferred from
available data. Finally, one could think of extending the cross-sectional setup
to a dynamic framework where the PD estimates are also observed at dif-
ferent points in time and hence the latent PDs and the error terms have to
be modeled by suitable stochastic processes. Such a framework would allow
forecasting future PDs as well as a lead-lag analysis across different raters.
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3.2 A dynamic latent variable model for or-
dinal credit ratings
3.2.1 Model specification
In this section we develop a model framework to derive a consensus rating for
raters providing ordinal rating information, e.g., external agency ratings. Our
model is designed for a dynamic framework capturing a time dependent rating
process. Despite the fact that the raters publish ordinal ratings, we assume
that they estimate a numerical variable—representing the creditworthiness
of the firm—in an internal rating process. Each firm is then assigned to
a particular rating class if this variable lies within a certain interval (e.g.,
McNeil and Wendin, 2007; Stefanescu et al., 2009). In general, the specific
rating process including both the estimation as well as the scale of the variable
(representing the creditworthiness) is unknown. In the literature, modeling
the creditworthiness, was first discussed by Altman (1968) who introduces the
Z-score. Z-scores are used to predict corporate defaults and are an easy-to-
calculate control measure for the financial distress status of companies. The
Z-score uses multiple corporate income and balance sheet values to measure
the financial health of a company. Furthermore, Merton (1974) assumes
that the creditworthiness can be reflected by the distance-to-default (DD)
capturing the distance of the firm’s asset value to its default threshold on
the real line. Alternatively, the creditworthiness variable can also be the
result of a ordered probit or logit regression model (e.g., Altman and Rijken,
2004). To obtain ordinal ratings, the estimated DD, the Z-score, or any
other numerical variable representing the creditworthiness—which is in the
following referred to as “rating score”—is mapped onto an ordinal rating
scale by the raters.
Let {1, . . . , Kj} be the set of possible non-default rating classes of rater j in
descending creditworthiness. That is, 1 denotes the best credit quality and
Kj the worst non-default rating class of rater j. Further, Sij(t) denotes the
estimated rating score (e.g., negative DD, Z-score) and rij(t) the associated
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observed ordinal rating of firm i by rater j at time t. The relationship
between rij(t) and Sij(t) is given by
rij(t) = k ⇔ Sij(t) ∈ [λk−1,j, λk,j), (3.2)
for a monotonically increasing sequence λk,j with k = 1, . . . , Kj. The class
boundaries are assumed to be constant over time. The data consists of ob-
servations for J raters and T time points. Observing rating k for a firm by
rater j means that its rating score lies somewhere in the interval [λk−1,j, λk,j).
In general, the thresholds λk,j are not provided by the raters. One possibility
to obtain λk,j is to relate the ratings to the observable empirical default rates.
In particular, the thresholds can be computed by using the empirical default
rates on an appropriate scale1. Assuming that the scores of empirical default
rates, Sij(t), are defined on the real line we have to fix the lower as well
as the upper threshold (λ0,j = −∞ and λKj ,j = +∞, respectively). The
length of the intervals need not be equal and may differ from rater to rater.
Nevertheless, it is expected that firms within the same interval will exhibit
roughly the same creditworthiness (Stefanescu et al., 2009).
Due to general informational asymmetry between firm owners and raters2
which can be due to limited access to the existing information, such as in-
complete accounting information (Duffie and Lando, 2001), or delayed ob-
servations of the driving risk factors (Guo et al., 2009) the raters cannot
estimate the “true” score (reflecting the creditworthiness) of a firm. Assum-
ing that the yielding rating errors can be modeled additively3 and following
Equation 3.2 the relationship between the estimated rating score Sij(t) and
1Beside this, we assume that raters do not change their rating technology during the
desired time period, i.e, they are always measuring creditworthiness on the same scale.
This assumption justifies time independent λk,j .
2The general informational asymmetry between firm owners and raters constitutes the
cornerstone of modern corporate finance (e.g., Leland and Pyle, 1977; Berk and DeMarzo,
2007).
3This is in line with Duffie and Lando (2001) who build their model on a Merton-type
log normal firm value process and assume that the error in the observation of the firm
value is normal and additive to the log of the firm value.
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the latent score Si(t) on the score scale is given by
Sij(t) = Si(t) + ij(t), (3.3)
where ij(t) denotes the rating error for firm i by rater j at time t. In the
following, the latent score Si(t) is also referred to as the consensus score.
On the right hand side of Equation 3.3 we find two terms, which have to
be specified: (1) The latent score Si(t) which describes the consensus credit-
worthiness and (2) the error term ij(t) which captures the accuracy of the
rating system of a specific rater. In the following those terms are specified
for both the dynamic latent trait model and the benchmark approach.
Despite the fact that the scores Sij(t) are unknown, the latent scores Si(t)
and the bias/variance structure of the rating errors can be estimated in our
framework by specifying the distribution of the rating errors and using the
interval thresholds λ·,j along with the relationship of Equation 3.2. The
estimated consensus scores Si(t) can then be mapped on the rater-specific
ordinal scale to derive the consensus ratings r∗ij(t) which obviously depend
on the used rating system (of rater j). Since rij(t) and r
∗
ij(t) for all i and j
are on the same rating scale one can easily compare these ratings and derive
inference about the quality of the ratings rij(t).
Dynamic latent trait model
Latent consensus score. In order to specify the latent scores Si(t), we
follow the lines of McNeil and Wendin (2007); Stefanescu et al. (2009) and
assume that the scores are driven by market- (systematic risk) as well as
firm-specific effects (idiosyncratic risk). We define a time-dependent process
mi(t) capturing the idiosyncratic changes and a latent market factor f(t)
capturing the systematic development of the latent scores Si(t). The id-
iosyncratic changes mi(t) capture the firm-specific risk and can be modeled
as an adequate time series process to cope with repeated observations. The
latent market f(t), capturing the development of the market, implies a cor-
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relation structure between the different firms and can also be modeled by an
adequate time-dependent process, e.g., a stationary auto-regressive process
or a random walk. Let νi be the firm specific long-term mean of firm i which
can be interpreted as the historical average creditworthiness of the firm. The
development of the latent scores Si(t) on the score scale is given by
Si(t) = νi +mi(t) + αf(t), (3.4)
where the factor loading α captures the dependence of Si(t) on f(t).
In order to estimate the consensus scores Si(t) we have to specify the un-
derlying processes and distributions of this framework. We specify the time-
dependent processes, describing the development of Si(t) (Equation 3.4), the
firm-specific changes mi(t) and the latent market factor f(t) as AR(1) pro-
cesses
mi(t) = βimi(t− 1) + ωi(t), (3.5)
f(t) = γf(t− 1) + ξ(t). (3.6)
mi(t) and f(t) are assumed to start with zero at t = 0. ωi(t) is a normal
distributed error term with mean zero and a constant variance across time
and firms, and ξ(t) is a standard normal distributed error term. βi (|βi| <
1) and γ (|γ| < 1) reflect the dependence on period t − 1 (inter-temporal
correlation).
Rating error. In order to specify the rating errors ij(t), we assume that
they are independent of the firms and their characteristics (in particular,
their creditworthiness itself) and the general rating process does not change
over time t (see Section 3.1). Assuming that µj and σj denote the mean
and standard deviation of the rating errors ij(t), respectively, the rating
errors ij(t) are given by
ij(t) = µj + σjZij(t) (3.7)
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where Zij(t) is assumed to be independent standard normal distributed over
i, j and t.
Benchmark Model
In addition to the dynamic latent trait model, we define an intuitive bench-
mark approach and compare it with our dynamic latent trait model. Being
conservative, one could consider to take the companies’ worst rating as the
benchmark. This is inappropriate for two reasons. Firstly, such an approach
disregards the information contained in the other available rating sources.
Secondly, from an economic point of view a rated company must be con-
vinced that its creditquality lies somewhere between its ratings and is not
represented by the worst rating. Otherwise there would be little reason to
obtain several ratings (Hsueh and Kidwell, 1988). Hence, without any rater
specific characteristics, the “mean” of the observed ratings could serve as a
consensus benchmark.
Latent consensus score. Our benchmark model follows the idea that for
any time t, the consensus score Si(t) of a company is simply the mean over
rating scores Sij(t). In doing so, we do not assume any time-dependent pro-
cess driving the development of Si(t), i.e., for any time t, Si(t) is independent
of Si(t− 1).
Rating errors. For the rating errors, we assume that there are no rater
specific error terms µj and σj, but a constant standard deviation σ of the
rating errors between the raters. This implies that all raters are weighted
equally in the estimation process. Within our model framework the relation-
ship between consensus score Si(t) and the estimated scores Sij(t) for the
benchmark model is given by
Sij(t) = Si(t) + σZij(t), (3.8)
with Zij(t) distributed as in the dynamic case.
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One drawback of this model specification is that these assumptions for the
rating errors and the latent scores may lead to distorted results for rating
data including missings, i.e., some companies are not rated by all agencies
(see Figure 3.6).
3.2.2 Application
We apply our dynamic latent variable model for ordinal rating information
to the iTraxx Europe companies. For this portfolio we obtain rating infor-
mation from the big three rating agencies Standard&Poor’s, Moody’s and
Fitch. The big three external rating agencies use different rating systems
with different granularity as well as different labels (typically, a combination
of letters, numbers and/or modifiers). Nowadays, almost all large corporates
are nowadays rated by at least one of the big three rating agencies, Stan-
dard&Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch (e.g. Kliger and Sarig, 2000). Obviously,
they do not always agree on the creditworthiness of the firms, and there-
fore differ in their opinion about the default probabilities of these corporates
(Jewell and Linvingston, 2002; Cantor and Packer, 1995).
Data Description
Ordinal ratings of the iTraxx Europe companies. We use histori-
cal long-term issuer ratings of the constituents of the iTraxx Europe index
(Series 10) from February 2007 to January 2009 provided by the big three
external rating agencies Standard&Poor’s, Fitch and Moody’s. The iTraxx
Europe index series consists of the 125 most-liquid CDS referencing European
investment-grade entities and a new series is determined by dealer liquidity
poll every six months. Most of the 125 names in the indexes are large multina-
tionals and have traded equity. We choose the iTraxx Europe index, because
it forms a representative contingent of the overall European credit derivative
market and its constituents have a high number of co-ratings (occurrences
of ratings of a single firm by two different raters) from the big three rating
agencies. The time series was constructed using historical ordinal rating an-
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nouncements taken from Reuters Credit Views. We exclude all companies
for which we do not have rating information of at least two agencies for the
complete time period, i.e., those with withdrawn ratings and entities which
acquire a rating for the first time within the selected time frame. This pro-
cess yields a sample of 5616 monthly ratings for 95 companies over 24 months
(February 2007 to January 2009). Table 3.6 shows the co-ratings structure
of the three raters. The average number of ratings for each month is 2.46.
Fitch Moody’s S&P
Fitch 88 44 88
Moody’s 44 51 51
S&P 88 51 95
Table 3.6: Co-ratings structure for 95 out of the 125 iTraxx Europe (Se-
ries 10) companies of the big three external rating agencies Fitch, Moody’s
and Standard&Poor’s (S&P).
As described above, the three rating agencies use different rating systems.
Moody’s rating system for global corporates contains 20 non-default rating
categories, ranging from Aaa to C and is so in the near default ratings more
granular than the rating systems of Fitch and Standard&Poor’s (Emery and
Ou, 2009). These two agencies assign 17 non-default rating categories (AAA
to CCC/C) to global corporates (Needham and Verde, 2009; Vazza et al.,
2009). Table 3.7 shows the number of ratings (per rating category and rater)
of the monthly ratings from February 2007 to January 2009 for the rating
agencies Fitch, Moody’s and Standard&Poor’s.
According to the three rating distributions of this rating data, only one firm
is rated as a non-investment firm (ContinentalAG) and this only by Stan-
dard&Poor’s (see Crouhy et al., 2001, for a description of investment grades
and speculative grades). The distributions show also that the granularity of
the three rating systems is equal in the relevant segment of this rating data.
The rating history of 57 firms (60%) changed over the considered time period.
Fitch changed the ratings of 35 firms, where 29 firms were downgraded and
4 firms were upgraded. The remaining two companies experienced a down-
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Fitch Moody’s S&P
label no. label no. label no.
1 AAA 6 Aaa 18 AAA 0
2 AA+ 85 Aa1 176 AA+ 45
3 AA 148 Aa2 41 AA 167
4 AA− 193 Aa3 54 AA− 233
5 A+ 226 A1 79 A+ 170
6 A 243 A2 153 A 251
7 A− 410 A3 225 A− 473
8 BBB+ 454 Baa1 231 BBB+ 576
9 BBB 315 Baa2 183 BBB 292
10 BBB− 30 Baa3 64 BBB− 72
11 BB+ 2 Ba1 0 BB+ 0
12 BB 0 Ba2 0 BB 1
13 worse 0 worse 0 worse 0
Table 3.7: Number of ratings (per rating category and rater) of the 95 out
of the 125 iTraxx Europe companies.
grade as well as an upgrade. Moody’s changed the ratings of 17 firms, where 8
firms were downgraded and 8 firms were upgraded (the remaining company
experienced two upgrades as well as two downgrades). Standard&Poor’s
changed the ratings of 45 firms, where 29 firms were downgraded and 12
firms were upgraded (the remaining four company experienced upgrade(s) as
well as downgrade(s)). Hence, a clear tendency of downgrading is observable
in this period.
In order to model the consensus ratings (Equation 3.3), each ordinal rating
is identified with a numerical interval reflecting the upper and lower bound
of the creditworthiness on the real line (see Equation 3.2). Here, we estimate
the thresholds for the ordinal ratings using the empirical default rates (1990–
2006) provided by the external raters (Needham and Verde, 2009; Emery and
Ou, 2009; Vazza et al., 2009) by following the approach proposed by Neagu
et al. (2009). They relate empirical PDs to ratings on an appropriate score
scale. The score variable represents a rank ordering of risk of default over
some future time horizon (we use a one year future time period). The task is
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to find a transformation of the score variable into an empirical PD. In other
words, this method aims at finding a function F such that:
PD = F (score),
which can be written by using a default indicator as:
Prob(default indicator = 1) = F (score)
and gives the base formulation for the binary response class of models. Dif-
ferent types of models, utilizing different forms for the function F , can be
fit. Neagu et al. (2009) suggest to try the three most commonly used binary
response models: logit, probit, and complementary log-log (CLL) models.
These models can be applied directly to the score data, but in real-world ap-
plications the score data tends to exhibit a high degree of skewness. In this
case it is recommended that a transformation of the score variable is made: a
Box-Cox power transformation (Fox, 1997) or a Box-Tidwell transformation
(Granger and Newbold, 1977).
In particular, we use the published historical empirical global corporate de-
fault rates of the three external rating agencies from 1990 to 2006 (Needham
and Verde, 2009; Emery and Ou, 2009; Vazza et al., 2009). In order to yield
one-year empirical default rates we compute the averages over the time pe-
riod. We then fit all combinations of binary response class models (probit,
logit, and CLL) and transformations (Box-Cox power and Box-Tidwell) to
the average default rates. A probit score model with Box-Tidwell transfor-
mation is selected as the best method according to the Hosmer-Lemeshow
statistic (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 2000). Figure 3.5 shows the estimated
“mapping” lines using a probit score model with Box-Tidwell transforma-
tion for the three different rating systems of Fitch, Moody’s, and Standard
& Poor’s using the empirical default rates from 1990 to 2006. Note, that the
rating system of Moody’s is finer on the upper side, i.e., assigning four more
rating grades to the high PD segment than the other two raters.
Whereas the empirical default rates and the PD mapping of Fitch and Stan-
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Figure 3.5: Mapping of the empirical default rates stemming from the three
raters on the score scale based on a probit score model with Box-Tidwell
transformation using the empirical default rates from 1990 to 2006.
dard&Poor’s seem to be rather similar, Moody’s empirical default rates and
mapping line is clearly below the other two. E.g., in average the difference
on the probit scale between the investment grades of Standard&Poor’s and
Moody’s is 0.139.
In order to cleave to the ordinal structure of ratings, thresholds for the map-
ping PDs derived from the empirical default rates have to be computed. We
compute the thresholds by the means of two adjacent mapping PDs on the
logit scale for each rater j. I.e., the upper threshold λk of rating class k =
1, . . . , Kj − 1 of rater j is given by λk = 1/2(logit(PDk+1) + logit(PDk))
and the “lower” threshold of the best rating class is −∞ and the “upper”
threshold of the worst rating class is +∞ (Altman and Rijken, 2004).
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Dow Jones EURO STOXX 50. For comparison reason we use the Dow
Jones EURO STOXX 50 as a representative market development of the
iTraxx Europe portfolio from February 2007 to January 2009 (see Figure 3.7).
The Dow Jones EURO STOXX 50 is the leading stock (price) index for the
Eurozone and covers 50 stocks from 12 Eurozone countries: Austria, Bel-
gium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. At January 2009, stocks of 30 out of the
95 companies are contained in the EURO STOXX 50.
Analysis of the big three rating agencies using their ratings for the
iTraxx Europe companies
Model estimation. Using the available ordinal ratings rij(t) for each com-
pany i = 1, . . . , 95 (out of the 125 iTraxx Europe companies) and external
rating agency j = {F,M, SP} from t = 1, . . . , 24 (February 2007 to January
2009) and the associated thresholds λj,k for k = 1, . . . , Kj with KF = 17,
KM = 20, and KSP = 17 we estimate the model parameters of our dynamic
latent trait model as well as the parameters of our benchmark model. For
the estimation frequentist as well as Bayesian techniques can be used. E.g.,
the static model in Section 3.1 is estimated by standard maximum likelihood
estimation. Here, we follow McNeil and Wendin (2007) and Stefanescu et al.
(2009) and choose a Bayesian estimation approach using Markov chain Monte
Carlo methods (MCMC) and Gibbs sampling (Carlin and Louis, 2009). Such
an approach requires prior distributions to be chosen for the parameter set.
In order to minimize the influence of the prior distributions on the posterior
distribution we have specified non-informative priors for all our parameters.
In particular, we run four parallel Markov chains, each initialized with a dif-
ferent seed and a different random number generator. The Gibbs sampler
ran for 50, 000 iterations, using a thinning of 10 whereby the first 5, 000 were
discarded as burn-in period. This yields 4, 500 draws from the posterior for
each parameter for each chain. Trace plots as well as the Geweke diagnos-
tic and the Gelman Rubin’s convergence diagnostic indicated satisfactory
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convergence of all chains (e.g., Gelman and Rubin, 1992; Plummer et al.,
2008).
Model selection. In order to compare our dynamic latent trait model
with the benchmark model we use the deviance information criterion (DIC;
according to Spiegelhalter et al., 2002). The DIC is a generalization of the
Akaike information criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian information criterion
(BIC) for hierarchical models. In contrast to the AIC and BIC, DIC allows to
compare Bayesian hierarchical models where the effective number of parame-
ters is not clearly defined. Similar to the other information criteria a trade-off
between model fit and model complexity is evaluated. The DIC contains one
penalty term for the effective number of parameters used measuring model
complexity and one term equal to the deviance of the likelihood measuring
model fit. A lower DIC value indicates a better model fit. According to
Spiegelhalter et al. (2002), if the difference in DIC is greater than 10, then
the model with the larger DIC value has considerably less support than the
model with the lower DIC value.
For our models, the lower DIC value of our dynamic latent trait model
(DIC = 9485.77) indicates that this model dominates in the terms of model fit
as well as model complexity the obvious benchmark model (DIC = 12319.82).
Results for the dynamic latent trait model
Rating errors. We begin our analysis of the estimation results with the
rating errors. Our dynamic latent trait model captures estimates for the
rating bias µj and the standard deviation σj of the rating error of the big
three external rating agencies on the score scale. Table 3.8 shows the results
for the estimated posterior distribution of the parameters for the three raters
µj and σj, respectively. The posterior distributions of the parameters are
characterized by the mean values (mean) and the standard deviations (SD)
of the 18, 000 (4× 4, 500) posterior draws.
We infer from Table 3.8 that Fitch has the smallest absolute rating bias from
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µj σj
mean SD mean SD
Fitch 0.0155 0.0018 0.0752 0.0021
Moody’s −0.0887 0.0024 0.1013 0.0029
S&P 0.0732 0.0017 0.0641 0.0017
Table 3.8: Estimated rating bias µj and standard deviations σj for the rat-
ing errors (on the score scale) of the big three external rating agencies Fitch,
Moody’s and Standard&Poor’s. The posterior distributions of the parame-
ters are characterized by the mean values (mean) and the standard deviations
(SD) of the 18, 000 (4× 4, 500) posterior draws.
the consensus on the score scale with respect to the posterior mean (0.0155).
Moody’s clearly seems to be too optimistic in its credit assessment yielding
a posterior mean for the rating bias µ of −0.089 on the score scale. Note,
that our model is based on the thresholds λj,k (and therefore PD equivalents)
which are clearly lower for Moody’s than the other two raters. Despite the
high difference (on the score scale: 0.139) in the PD equivalents of Moody’s
and Standard&Poor’s indicated in the Appendix (see Figure 3.5), Moody’s is
still more optimistic by rating investment-grade firms than Standard&Poor’s.
In this study, Standar&Poor’s is with a posterior mean of the rating bias of
0.073 the most conservative rater out of the three considered rating agencies.
In addition to the rating biases, our model captures the standard deviation
(precision) of the rating errors of the three raters (Table 3.8). Whereas the
posterior mean of the standard deviation σ of the rating errors is rather
similar for Fitch and Standard&Poor’s (0.075, 0.064), Moody’s has a higher
posterior mean of the standard deviation (0.101), indicating that its ratings
deviate more strongly from the consensus ratings.
Consensus score. In addition to the analysis of the bias/variance struc-
ture of the rating errors, we analyze the estimated consensus scores of our
dynamic latent trait model. Instead of showing the consensus scores of all
iTraxx Europe companies, Figure 3.6 shows the estimated consensus rating
scores of four sample companies (ENELSPA, NESTLE, GLENCORE INT.
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AG, ROYAL BANK OF SCOTLAND) and compares them with the original
ratings (mapped onto the score scale) of the three raters Fitch, Moody’s and
Standard&Poor’s as well as with the mean rating score of the three raters.
Figure 3.6: Estimated consensus score, the mean score, and the original
ratings mapped onto the score scale of the big three external rating agencies
Fitch (F), Moody’s (M) and Standard&Poor’s (S).
Due to the fact that the companies ENELSPA and NESTLE are rated by all
three raters, the consensus score (solid line) is very similar to the mean score
(dashed line). In the case of the two other companies GLENCORE INT. AG
and ROYAL BANK OF SCOTLAND where for each company ratings of only
two raters are available, Figure 3.6 shows remarkable differences between the
consensus and the mean score. Due to rater specific error terms, our latent
consensus score is able to incorporate such a missingness structure.
Furthermore, we can confirm the need of a latent market factor in our dy-
namic latent trait model by showing the strong relationship between our
latent market f(t) and a reference market, the Dow Jones EURO STOXX 50
index (correlation: −0.946)4.
Consensus rating. In addition to the analysis of the consensus scores, we
can use the consensus ratings derived by mapping the scores onto the rater’s
rating scales to analyze the rating agreement of the raters.
An intuitive way for this is the Hit-Miss-Match (HMM) Matrix which counts
how many consensus ratings exactly match the ratings provided by a rater.
Table 3.9, 3.10 and 3.11 show the HMM matrix for each rater.
In Table 3.9 most ratings are on the main diagonal or one rating notch below
or above indicating a high agreement between Fitch’s ratings and the con-
sensus ratings. Table 3.10 shows that Moody’s ratings are rather one or more
rating notches below the consensus ratings, confirming the negative rating
4Note, that the negative correlation is due to the fact that an increase in f(t) on the
score scale indicates a decrease in the creditworthiness.
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Figure 3.7: Estimated latent market factor f(t) and the Dow Jones EURO
STOXX 50 index over the full time period (2007-02 to 2009-01).
bias shown in Table 3.8. In contrast to Moody’s ratings, Standard&Poor’s
ratings are rather one or more rating notches above the consensus ratings,
confirming the positive rating bias shown in Table 3.8.
Furthermore, we can compute the proportion of ratings for each rating de-
viation (measured in rating notches) between the consensus ratings and the
ratings provided by the raters (shown in Table 3.12).
−4 −3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3
Fitch 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.154 0.725 0.108 0.004 0.000
Moody’s 0.000 0.000 0.017 0.027 0.273 0.547 0.115 0.020
S&P 0.003 0.030 0.429 0.532 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.003
Table 3.12: Proportion of ratings per rating class deviation between the
consensus ratings and the origin ratings provided by the big three rating
agencies Fitch, Moody’s and Standard&Poor’s.
Table 3.12 shows that Fitch’s ratings have a very high accordance (72.5%)
with the estimated consensus ratings. According to the estimated rating
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biases (see Table 3.8) Moody’s is rather too “optimistic” than the other
raters. These effect is also seen in Table 3.12. Only 27.3% of Moody’s
ratings exactly hit the consensus rating. 84.7% are within one rating notch
and 68.2% are more optimistic, i.e., are at least one rating category better
than our estimated consensus rating. For Standard&Poor’s we obtain that
53.9% are within one rating category in comparison to the consensus rating.
In contrast to Fitch, Standard&Poor’s have few ratings which are even 4
rating classes below the estimated consensus rating.
3.2.3 Discussion
In this chapter we investigate a new dynamic framework for aggregating
credit rating information in a multi-rater set-up, i.e., in situations where or-
dinal ratings from different sources for the same firm are available. In our
model we assume that the raters do not directly estimate the ordinal ratings,
but they estimate a numerical variable—representing the creditworthiness
of the firm—in an internal rating process. We treat the true unobservable
numerical variable of a firm as a latent variable and model its dynamic by
using systematic as well as idiosyncratic changes. In contrast to other meth-
ods, our model class allows missingness in the data and captures the panel
structure of the data.
In addition to the solution for the aggregation problem, our model is useful
in the validation of the different sources. The analysis of the mean/variance
structure of the rating errors yields to rater-specific rating biases as well as
the precision of the different rating systems.
The suggested framework for modeling consensus of a multi-rater panel is
very general and allows for a variety of possible enhancements. We could
aim at employing more flexible models for the distributions of the rating
scores and rating errors, e.g., via suitable mixtures of normals. We could
also allow more flexibility in the specification of the factor loading α cap-
turing the dependence between the latent scores and the latent market (see
Equation 3.4) by using a firm- or industry-specific factor loading. In ad-
48
dition, it would be interesting to allow for industry-specific parameters for
the rating bias, the standard deviation of the rating error and the long-term
mean (see Section 3.1). We could also try to use an external market factor
(e.g., the Dow Jones EURO STOXX 50) instead of a latent market factor
to describe the systematic changes of the latent scores. The use of Bayesian
estimation techniques allows very flexible specification of models, so that we
intend to explore these possible enhancements in our future research.
By using the ratings for the iTraxx Europe companies (Series 10) provided by
the big three rating agencies Fitch, Moody’s and Standard&Poor’s we com-
pute a more informative rating, the consensus rating for each company and
show that there are remarkable differences in the rating behavior and rating
systems of the three raters. In particular, we infer from our results, that
Moody’s is the most favorable and Standard&Poor’s the most pessimistic
rater.
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Chapter 4
Modeling bookmakers odds
In the course of growing popularity of online sports betting, the analysis and
forecasting of competitive sports has been receiving increasing interest. Fore-
casts of sports events are often based on one of two types of information: rat-
ings or rankings of the competitors’ ability/strength, and bookmakers odds
for winning a competition of two or more contestants. Here, we show how
both types of forecasts—winning probabilities and underlying abilities—can
be derived from both sources of information—ability ratings and bookmakers
odds.
Sports ratings or rankings are typically derived by suitably aggregating the
competitors’ previous performances and are often found to provide predic-
tive power in forecasting tasks. Boulier and Stekler (1999) show that rank-
ings provide forcasting information for basketball tournaments and tennis
matches. Lebovic and Sigelman (2001) analyze the predictive accuracy of
college football rankings. Suzuki and Ohmori (2008) use the FIFA/Coca
Cola World rating (Fe´de´ration Internationale de Football Association, 2008),
one of the most popular rating system in soccer, as a forecasting tool for the
last four FIFA World Cups (1994, 1998, 2002, 2006). In addition, Dyte and
Clarke (2000) use the FIFA ratings to predict the distribution of scores in in-
ternational soccer matches. Another popular rating system is the Elo rating
system, originally developed to calculate the relative skills of chess players
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(e.g., Elo, 2008), which has subsequently also been applied to various other
sports including soccer. Song et al. (2009) apply it as one method to forecast
the winner of single American Football games. Edmans et al. (2007) select
important soccer games based on the World Football Elo Ratings.
Bookmakers odds represent a rather different type of rating compared to the
methods above. Based on the bookmakers’ expert judgments (which typically
include, but are not limited to, knowledge about past performances) the odds
reflect expected outcomes in a particular competition where the bookmakers
have strong economic incentives to rate the competitors correctly. A bias
(in either direction, too good or too bad) will cost them money, or, in other
words, will reduce their profits. Hence, bookmakers can be seen as experts in
the matter of sports rating (see Pope and Peel, 1989) and are likely to provide
good predictions (Forrest and Simmons, 2000). This is confirmed by various
empirical studies in which fixed odds are found to be an efficient forecasting
instrument for the outcome of single matches (e.g., Vlastakis et al., 2009;
Spann and Skiera, 2009; Song et al., 2007; Forrest et al., 2005b; Dixon and
Pope, 2004; Boulier and Stekler, 2003).
One advantage of employing bookmakers odds is that winning probabilities
for the corresponding competition can be derived easily while this is not
straightforward for many of the ability ratings. However, if abilities are mea-
sured on a ratio scale (or can be transformed to such), winning probabilities
for pairwise matches can be derived using the approach of the Bradley and
Terry (1952) model. Notable in this respect is the Elo rating from which
pairwise winning probabilities for single matches can be obtained (e.g., Ste-
fani and Pollard, 2007; Edmans et al., 2007). Thus, when the competition of
interest is a single match, forecasts based on ability ratings and bookmakers
odds can be compared easily. The same is not true if the competition is a
more complex tournament for which the bookmakers odds, by their prospec-
tive nature, can include additional effects such as group draws or seedings.
To link forecasts of abilities (associated with pairwise winning probabilities)
and winning probabilities for sports tournaments, we suggest a simulation ap-
proach that allows to (approximately) map abilities to winning probabilities
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and vice versa.
4.1 General model specification for book-
makers odds
As an alternative application, we use the above introduced general model
framework to model the rating process of bookmakers. By publishing odds,
bookmakers rate the players’ or teams’ chances of winning a competition or
tournament. Hence, bookmakers odds can be seen as prospective ratings of
the performance of the participating players or teams in a sports competition.
The raw quoted bookmakers odds are no “honest” odds, but are the payout
amounts for successful bets which has two important implications: (1) They
still contain the stake, i.e., the payment for placing the bet (the “1” in Equa-
tion 4.1 below). (2) More importantly, the bookmakers odds contain a profit
margin, the so-called “overround”, which means that the “true” underlying
odds are actually larger (see e.g., Henery, 1999; Forrest et al., 2005b). As-
suming that the overround δ is constant across all possible outcomes (e.g.,
the same for all competitors winning a tournament), it can be computed by
restricting the corresponding probabilities to sum to unity. More precisely,
the raw quoted odds rawodds i,b for event i by bookmaker b can be adjusted
to odds i,b and then transformed to probabilities pi,b via:
odds i,b = (rawodds i,b − 1) δb, (4.1)
pi,b = 1− odds i,b
1 + odds i,b
. (4.2)
Then, δb for bookmaker b can be chosen such that
∑
i pi,b = 1. (Note, that
the complementary probabilities have to be used as the bookmakers odds
represent expectations for an outcome not to occur.) In the case of winning
odds for a tournament, this means that the implied winning probabilities
can be easily derived from the quoted odds for all competitors. When ap-
propriately adjusted and transformed, the bookmakers odds yield expected
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winning probabilities pi,b for each team/player i = 1, . . . , I and bookmaker
b = 1, . . . , B.
We can then adopt our general model framework (Equation 2.1) and relate
the expected winning probabilities pi,b to the latent winning probability for
team or player i on a logit scale
logit(pi,b) = logit(pi) + i,b, (4.3)
where i,b is the deviation of bookmaker b for team or player i. The (un-
observable) “true” winning logits logit(pi) for team or player i reflect the
bookmakers consensus and the additional (unobservable) “error” term i,b of
bookmaker b for team or player i reflects the disagreement across the book-
makers. According to the specific competition or tournament this model can
be refined by team/player- or bookmaker-specific effects.
Applications. In the following we use the general model specification for
bookmakers odds in order to forecast the outcome and analyze the book-
makers agreement of three different and very popular sport tournaments,
the UEFA EURO 2008 (Section 4.2), Wimbledon 2009 (Section 4.3), and the
UEFA Champions League 2008/09 (Section 4.4) .
4.2 UEFA EURO 2008
We first apply our general model framework for bookmakers odds stemming
from a variety of bookmakers (Equation 4.3) to the UEFA EURO 2008, one
of the world’s biggest sports events that took place in June 2008 in Austria
and Switzerland.
After deriving the bookmaker consensus from the general model, the con-
sensus information is compared to the forecasts from the World Football Elo
rating (also considered in a note from UBS Wealth Management Research
Switzerland, 2008, for prediction of the EURO 2008) and the ranking im-
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plied by the FIFA/Coca Cola World rating (also employed in a note from
Raiffeisen Zentralbank, 2008), both also obtained on 2008-04-21.
This section is organized as follows: We first discuss some basic features of
sports ratings, bookmakers odds, and sports tournaments in Section 4.2.1.
Section 4.2.3 provides a data and tournament description for the EURO 2008
for which the various forecasts (using the bookmakers’ expectations and using
the World Football Elo ratings) are obtained and assessed in Section 4.2.4.
Section 4.2.5 concludes the analysis of the UEFA EURO 2008.
4.2.1 Ratings of (prob)abilities in sports tournaments
Sports ratings
Ratings of “abilities” or “strengths”. In competitive sports, players
or teams as well as their supporters are interested in ratings of the com-
petitors as a measure of their abilities or strengths. A common strategy
for deriving suitable ratings employs adaptive schemes which update assess-
ments based on historic performances upon availability of data about current
performances. Typical examples for this include the FIFA/Coca Cola World
rating in soccer or the ATP (Association of Tennis Professionals) rating in
tennis (see Stefani, 1997, for an overview). Some ratings are based on a sim-
ple point system while others employ statistical models, e.g., the Elo rating
(Elo, 2008) implies pairwise winning expectancies (see Joe, 1991). A natural
application of ability ratings is to employ them for forecasting performances
in future matches (e.g., Song et al., 2009). In some sports, ratings are also
used for deriving seedings which in turn can be used for forecasting as in
Boulier and Stekler (1999).
Bookmakers odds as ratings of winning probabilities. A rather dif-
ferent source of “ratings” of competitors in sports are bookmakers odds:
Unlike the ratings discussed above these are not derived directly from past
performances but emerge from “expert” knowledge. Of course, this typically
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encompasses knowledge about past results but may also take into account
expectations about future events. Due to the increasing popularity of online
sports betting, bookmakers odds are a type of data that is abundant and
easily available and that has been successfully employed in forecasts of sin-
gle matches (e.g., Vlastakis et al., 2009; Spann and Skiera, 2009; Song et al.,
2007; Forrest et al., 2005b; Dixon and Pope, 2004; Boulier and Stekler, 2003).
Another important difference between bookmakers odds and the ability rat-
ings discussed above is that they are an assessment of outcome probabilities
(e.g., winning probabilities in the case of sports tournaments) rather than of
the underlying abilities.
4.2.2 Sports tournaments
Pairwise comparisons. In many sports disciplines, winners and losers are
determined by pairwise comparisons, called matches or games. Clearly, the
outcome from a match depends on the current abilities of the two competi-
tors. Given abilities measured on a ratio scale, the classical method for com-
puting winning probabilities from abilities is the Bradley and Terry (1952)
approach which derives the probability for competitor i beating competitor j
as:
pii,j =
ability i
ability i + ability j
(i 6= j), (4.4)
where ability i is the ability for team i on a ratio scale. However, for many
sports rating systems it is not clear what the underlying measurement scale
is. A notable exception is the Elo rating (Elo, 2008) which uses a similar
approach for obtaining winning expectancies. Hence, as discussed in detail
below, Elo ratings can easily be transformed to abilities in the sense of Equa-
tion 4.4.
Tournament schedule. If a winner shall be determined from a group
(rather than just a pair) of competitors, this is typically accomplished by
using a sequence of pairwise comparisons, called tournament. Various de-
signs are available for constructing suitable schedules for such a tournament
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(see Scarf and Bilbao, 2006, for a discussion). In a round-robin tournament,
where each competitor (or player or team) plays each other, it is obvious that
the strongest competitor has the highest winning probability in each pairwise
comparison and therefore the highest chance to win the tournament, followed
by the second strongest competitor and so on. However, for other tourna-
ment schedules the strongest competitor does not necessarily have the highest
probability of winning. For example, if the tournament schedule is based on a
draw of a group phase and/or a knockout phase, some competitors might be
favored/discriminated by being drawn together with relatively weak/strong
competitors. However, when the tournament schedule and the abilities of
its participants are known, it is (in principle) straightforward to compute
the associated winning probabilities based on the pairwise probabilities from
Equation 4.4 by applying conditional probabilities to all possible tourna-
ment “paths”. As explicit enumeration of all paths can be burdensome, the
winning probabilities can also be approximated easily by simulating a large
number of tournament runs (100,000 say) and then assessing the empirical
winning proportions p˜ for each competitor:
ability pii,j 100,000
runs
p˜
abilities of
all competi-
tors
→ pairwise
winning
probabili-
ties for all
matches
→ tournament
simulations
→ simulated
winning
probabil-
ities for
tournament
The resulting (approximated) winning probabilities p˜(ability) then also cap-
ture all “tournament effects” induced by the schedule. Note that this
approach models the contestants’ abilities as constant over the course of
the competition and might be further enhanced to accommodate hypoth-
esized patterns of change in abilities. Also, this generic simulation setup
might require adaptation to some details of a specific tournament, e.g., for
EURO 2008 potential ties after the group phase need to be resolved (as
described in detail in Section 4.2.4).
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4.2.3 EURO 2008: Data and tournament description
Data
Elo ratings. The World Football Elo Ratings (Advanced Satellite Con-
sulting Ltd, 2008), Elo ratings for short, for all 16 teams participating in the
EURO 2008 have been collected from http://www.eloratings.net/ (ac-
cessed 2008-04-21). In contrast to many other sports rating systems (such
as the FIFA ratings below), the Elo ratings imply winning expectancies for
pairwise comparisons (see Elo, 2008, Equation 46). The probability that
team i beats team j can be related to
pii,j =
1
10−(Eloi−Eloj)/400 + 1
(i 6= j), (4.5)
where Eloi and Eloj are the Elo ratings for teams i and j, respectively. For
home teams (i.e., Austria and Switzerland in the EURO 2008), 100 rating
points are added to the Elo rating (Advanced Satellite Consulting Ltd, 2008).
Thus, the Elo ratings are essentially on a log10 scale which is somewhat
different from the standard Bradley and Terry (1952) model. However, using
Equations 4.4 and 4.5, it is easy to provide a transformation to log-abilities in
the Bradley-Terry sense which imply the same pairwise winning probabilities
pii,j. As the log-abilities are just defined up to a constant γ, we choose γ such
that they are on a logit scale:
log
(
ability
(ELO)
i
)
=
log(10)
400
Eloi + γ, (4.6)∑
i
logit−1
(
log
(
ability
(ELO)
i
))
= 1, (4.7)
where Equation 4.7 implies γ = −13.496 for the EURO 2008 data, log is
the natural logarithm, and logit−1 denotes the inverse of the logit function.
The resulting Elo log-abilities are provided in Table 4.1 where the logit scale
facilitates comparison with logits of tournament winning probabilities derived
in the following.
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Bookmakers odds. Longterm odds for winning the EURO 2008 were ob-
tained from the websites of 45 international bookmakers for all 16 partici-
pating teams on 2008-04-21. These are all of 50 European top-selling online
sports bookmakers who offered odds for this event. Prior to all further anal-
ysis, the odds are adjusted by removing the stake and a bookmaker-specific
overround (see Equation 4.1) and then transformed to winning probabili-
ties by means of Equation 4.2. This yields tournament winning probabilities
pi,b for i = 1, . . . , 16 teams and b = 1, . . . , 45 bookmakers which reflect the
bookmakers’ beliefs about the outcome of the EURO 2008.
FIFA ratings. The FIFA/Coca Cola World ratings (Fe´de´ration Interna-
tionale de Football Association, 2008), FIFA ratings for short, for all 16 par-
ticipating teams were retrieved from http://www.fifa.com/ on 2008-04-21.
These ratings capture abilities of the teams but on an unknown scale so that
it is not straightforward to compute pairwise winning probabilities pii,j or
tournament winning probabilities pi (see McHale and Davies, 2007, for an
approach for building more complex statistical models based on the FIFA
rating). Therefore, in the following, the FIFA ratings are employed only for
comparison as a ranking (rather than rating).
The tournament
The UEFA EURO 2008 is a tournament where 52 European national football
teams (UEFA’s members) compete in a multi-stage modus (qualification,
group and knockout stage) to determine the European champion. First,
16 teams are determined via a qualification stage for the group stage, i.e.,
the main EURO 2008 tournament carried out in June 2008 in Austria and
Switzerland. Table 4.1 lists the 16 teams as drawn into four groups, labeled A
through D. Each group of four plays a round-robin—every team plays every
other team, for a total of six matches within the group—and the top two
teams in each group advance to the next stage, the quarter-final. The winner
of group A plays against the second best team of group B (first quarter-final)
and the winner of group B plays against the second best team of group A
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(second quarter-final). Analogously, the winner of group C plays against the
second best team of group D (third quarter-final) and the winner of group D
plays against the second best team of group C (forth quarter-final). The
four winners of the quarter-finals reach the semi-finals, where the winner of
the first quarter-final plays against the winner of the second one and the
winner of the third quarter-final plays against the winner of the forth. The
winners of the semi-finals then play the final and the winner of the final is
the European football champion (Union of European Football Associations,
2009a).
4.2.4 Forecasting of the EURO 2008
In this section, forecasts of team (log-)abilities and winning probabilities for
the EURO 2008 tournament are obtained based on the Elo ratings and the
bookmakers odds, respectively. The resulting four quantities are compared
with the actual result of the tournament and the best-performing method is
analyzed in some more detail.
Forecasting based on the Elo ratings
As argued in Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.3, the Elo ratings Eloi (i = 1, . . . , 16)
represent an assessment of the current ability/strength of the teams partic-
ipating the EURO 2008. By construction, pairwise probabilities pii,j for all
combinations of participants can be obtained. Furthermore, to approximate
winning probabilities that include tournament effects such as the group draw,
the empirical winning proportions from 100,000 simulated tournaments are
used:
ability
(ELO)
i = exp
(
log(10)
400
Eloi − 13.496
)
, (4.8)
p
(ELO)
i = p˜
(
ability (ELO)
)
i
. (4.9)
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Thus, ability (ELO) is the vector of abilities (in the Bradley-Terry sense) based
on which the tournament simulations are carried out. The results for all
teams are reported in Table 4.1.
By adopting the classical Bradley-Terry model, the simulation of each match
yields only a winner and a loser without the possibility of a tie and without
further information about the number of goals or the goal difference. This
is sufficient for the knock-out stage of the tournament as it reflects that the
actual matches always have a winner (if necessary in overtime and penalties).
However, for the group phase within the simulation this approach might re-
sult in tied teams. If necessary, we resolve such ties by additional “fictitious”
matches between the tied teams to obtain unique winners and the runner-ups
of the groups.
Our simulation method could be extended by using more elaborate simulation
techniques including ties and number of goals, e.g., a model where the team
scores follow independent Poisson distributions (e.g., Maher, 1982; Dixon and
Coles, 1997; Dyte and Clarke, 2000), or an ordered probit regression model
(Goddard and Asimakopoulos, 2004).1
According to the Elo rating, Italy is the strongest team (log(ability(ELO)) =
−1.97) and also has the highest probability for winning the tournament
(p(ELO) = 18.28%). However, the second strongest team France has only
the third highest winning probability (log(ability(ELO)) = −2.09, p(ELO) =
14.08%) while Germany is only the fifth strongest but has the second high-
est winning probability (log(ability(ELO)) = −2.34, p(ELO) = 15.99%). Thus,
team Germany clearly profits from being drawn in a group (B) with weaker
competitors while France has a certain disadvantage from being placed in
a group (C) with strong competitors such as Italy. This tournament effect
can be conveniently assessed by comparing differences between the teams’
log-abilities and their winning logits, respectively (as both measurements
have been constructed such that they are on a logit scale). For example,
Italy’s margin over Germany of 0.37 (= −1.97− (−2.34)) is reduced to 0.16
1However, all approaches should give reasonable approximations of the probabilities for
being promoted to the next round.
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log(ability i) pi(%) logit(pi)
ELO BCM ELO BCM ELO BCM Group
Germany −2.34 −2.33 15.99 17.45 −1.66 −1.55 B
Spain −2.25 −2.41 13.14 12.21 −1.89 −1.97 D
Italy −1.97 −2.40 18.28 11.34 −1.50 −2.06 C
Portugal −2.95 −2.54 3.36 9.97 −3.36 −2.20 A
France −2.09 −2.50 14.08 9.14 −1.81 −2.30 C
Netherlands −2.33 −2.62 8.29 6.77 −2.40 −2.62 C
Croatia −2.86 −2.77 5.03 6.72 −2.94 −2.63 B
Czech Republic −2.67 −2.74 7.17 5.88 −2.56 −2.77 A
Switzerland −2.79 −2.88 5.18 3.92 −2.91 −3.20 A
Greece −2.93 −2.91 2.76 3.31 −3.56 −3.37 D
Sweden −3.32 −2.98 0.77 2.87 −4.86 −3.52 D
Russia −3.42 −3.00 0.55 2.72 −5.20 −3.58 D
Turkey −3.27 −3.06 1.30 2.26 −4.33 −3.77 A
Romania −2.72 −3.04 2.77 2.12 −3.56 −3.83 C
Poland −3.35 −3.19 1.19 2.05 −4.42 −3.87 B
Austria −3.93 −3.85 0.14 0.93 −6.55 −4.67 B
Table 4.1: Log-abilities, winning proabilities, and corresponding logits of all
teams for the EURO 2008 based on the Elo rating (ELO) and on the book-
maker consensus model (BCM). The ELO log-abilities are directly computed
from the Elo ratings and winning probabilities are derived via simulation.
The BCM logits are estimated by team-wise means of bookmaker log-odds,
the corresponding log-abilities are found by “inverse” simulation. The rows
are sorted by the BCM winning probabilities.
(= −1.5 − (−1.66)) by including tournament effects while France’s margin
over Germany of 0.25 is reversed to −0.15. Furthermore, it is worth noting
that team Spain, the favorite in group D, has the fourth highest winning
probability (p(ELO) = 13.14%) while Austria has the lowest chances of win-
ning the EURO 2008 (p(ELO) = 0.14%), nonwithstanding its potential home
advantage (see e.g., Forrest et al., 2005a; Clarke and Norman, 1995).
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Forecasting based on bookmakers odds
When appropriately adjusted and transformed, as described above, the
bookmakers odds yield expected winning probabilities pi,b for each team
i = 1, . . . , 16 and bookmaker b = 1, . . . , 45. In the following, a single forecast
for the winning probability of each team is obtained by aggregation of the
pi,b across bookmakers. Subsequently, a vector of underlying team abilities
is found by “inverse” application of the simulation approach adopted above.
The bookmakers odds are prospective ratings of the performance of the
16 participating teams in the EURO 2008 which vary between 45 bookmak-
ers. In order to obtain an aggregated measure for each team some sort of
consensus between we use the general model framework for bookmakers odds
stemming from a variety of bookmakers introduced above (Equation 4.3).
As the bookmakers’ expectations about the EURO 2008 are rather homo-
geneous a straightforward fixed-effects model with zero-mean deviations i,b
should be appropriate. Thus, the consensus winning logits are simply means
across bookmakers:
̂logit(pi) =
1
45
45∑
b=1
logit (pi,b) .
Transforming these winning logits back to the probability scale yields the
bookmakers’ consensus winning probabilities p
(BCM )
i . Both probabilities and
corresponding logits for this bookmakers consensus model (BCM), are shown
in Table 4.1. The model captures 98.21% of the variance of the pi,b, the
associated estimated standard error of i,b is 0.11396.
Although forecasting the winning probabilities for the EURO 2008 is the
main concern in our investigation, there is also interest in the team abili-
ties underlying the bookmakers’ expectations. The tournament schedule was
already known at the time the bookmakers odds were retrieved, and hence
should be included in the expectations about the outcome of the tourna-
ment. In order to strip the “tournament effects” (see Section 4.2.1) from this
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measure, we employ an “inverse” application of the simulation approached
described in the previous sections. More precisely, we want to find a set of
team abilities ability i (i = 1, . . . , 16) that result in simulated winning prob-
abilities p˜(ability)i that are as similar as possible to the consensus winning
probabilities p
(BCM )
i :
p
(BCM )
i = logit
−1
(
̂logit(pi)
)
, (4.10)
ability (BCM ) = argmin
ability
16∑
i=1
∣∣∣p(BCM )i − p˜ (ability)i∣∣∣ . (4.11)
The minimum in the second line is determined using a local search strategy
for the full vector ability (BCM ) where 100,000 tournament runs are employed
in each evaluation of p˜(·). The results are reported in Table 4.1.
According to the BCM, Germany has the highest chances of winning the
EURO 2008 (p(BCM ) = 17.45%) with some margin over Spain (12.21%) and
Italy (11.34%). Thus, although there is considerable overlap among the top
five teams obtained from BCM and Elo results, the ranking and associated
winning probabilities of these teams are rather different. Also, France (which
was the second strongest team according to the Elo rating) has only the fifth
largest winning probability (9.14%). Finally, host country Austria is again
expected to have the lowest winning probability (0.93%) but it is somewhat
larger in absolute terms compared to the Elo forecast.
In order to investigate the tournament effect, differences in the teams’ win-
ning logits can again be compared with differences in their log-abilities.
Again, this shows that Germany greatly profits from the group draw be-
cause its margin in terms of winning logits over Spain or Italy (0.42 and
0.51, respectively) is greatly reduced in terms of log-abilities (0.08 and 0.07).
Note also that this reduction is larger for Italy than for Spain, conveying
that Italy suffers particularly from being drawn in the strong group C (often
referred to as the “group of death”).
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Ex post comparison of all forecasts
The previous subsections present two different types of forecasts (abilities
and winning probabilities) derived from two different types of ratings (Elo
rating and bookmakers odds). As usual in forecasting, it is of central interest
which strategy performs best in practice. Although this is difficult to answer
because there are no “real” replications of the tournament, we can compare
the forecasts with the single real outcome of the EURO 2008.
Table 4.2 assesses the predictive performance of all four forecasts by com-
paring them with the actual tournament outcomes using Spearman’s rank
correlation. For the actual results, a total ranking including ties is employed,
as commonly used in rankings of such incomplete tournaments.2 First, this
shows that the winning probabilities (including the tournament effects) have
higher correlation with the actual outcome (0.525 for BCM and 0.304 for
ELO, respectively) compared to the corresponding (log-)abilities (0.441 and
0.203). Second, the forecasts based on the bookmakers odds clearly out-
perform those based on the Elo ratings. This conveys that the prospective
ratings of experts (i.e., the bookmakers) have been more useful than the
retrospective performance-based Elo ratings.
In addition to the four forecasts derived in this section, Table 4.2 also pro-
vides correlations with the ranking implied by the FIFA/Coca Cola World
rating. Interestingly, this has a higher Spearman correlation (0.373) with the
tournament outcome than the Elo forecasts. Furthermore, it is more closely
associated with both (log-)ability measurements (0.841 and 0.815) than with
the corresponding winning probabilities (0.809 and 0.809). This confirms
that the (retrospective) FIFA rating is an assessment of the teams’ current
ability and conveys that its predictive power could be enhanced if the corre-
sponding winning probabilities could be computed or simulated. However, as
no rigorous method for computing pairwise winning probabilities pii,j based
on the FIFA rating is known to us, we cannot pursue this approach here.
2Various strategies for dissolving the ties have been explored but did not lead to qual-
itatively different results.
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p(BCM ) ability(BCM ) p(ELO) ability(ELO) FIFA
Tournament ranking 0.525 0.441 0.304 0.203 0.373
p(BCM ) 0.988 0.871 0.771 0.809
ability(BCM ) 0.909 0.826 0.841
p(ELO) 0.956 0.809
ability(ELO) 0.815
Table 4.2: Spearman’s rank correlation between the actual tournament rank-
ing and rankings according to the estimated BCM winning probabilities and
(log-)abilities, simulated Elo winning probabilities and (log-)abilities (equiv-
alent to the original Elo rating), and the FIFA/Coca Cola World rating.
In order to investigate the sources of the good performance of the BCM for the
winning probabilities, it is useful to extract the two best-ranked teams from
each group in Table 4.1. This shows that the consensus winning probabilities
correctly predict five teams (Germany, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Croatia) which
played the quarter-finals, as well as the actual final (played by the teams
Germany and Spain). The big surprises of the tournament were teams Russia
and Turkey which both reached the semi-finals rather unexpectedly. Whereas
the BCM ranked team Russia better than the Elo and the FIFA rating, the
converse is true for team Turkey. Furthermore, France surprisingly did not
reach the quarter-finals which was neither expected by the bookmakers nor
using the Elo or FIFA ratings. However, it was somewhat more likely using
the BCM.
Tournament analysis based on the BCM forecast
In addition to the team abilities and winning probabilities (Table 4.1), some
further insights can be gained from the best-performing BCM forecast due
to adoption of the simulation approach. So far, we have only considered the
empirical winning proportions of each team in the 100,000 tournament runs.
But, of course, the empirical proportions of reaching the quarter-final, semi-
final, and final can be extracted as well. Figure 4.1 shows the performance of
65
each team in the simulations based on ability (BCM ) as a performance curve
(or “survival” curve over the course of the tournament). The endpoints of
the curves are the simulated winning probabilities, which are by construction
(Equation 4.14) (roughly) identical to the probabilities derived from the BCM
(Table 4.1).
The performance curves in Figure 4.1 show that groups B and D are rather
heterogeneous with weaker teams and clear favorites (Germany and Spain,
respectively) while groups A and C are rather homogeneous. This group
effect can also be quantified on an aggregated level by considering deviations
of the mean group winning logits (computed from Table 4.1) from the overall
mean winning logits across all teams. Despite the fact that group B includes
the bookmakers’ favorite of winning the European championship (Germany),
group B clearly is the weakest group and has the smallest chance to include
the winner (with a deviation of −0.187 on the logit scale). This is followed
by group D with a deviation of −0.116. Group C, on the other hand, is
clearly the toughest group and has the greatest probability of including the
champion (0.293). Group A can be interpreted as the average group with a
deviation of 0.010 from the overall mean.
The simulation also provides information about the most likely coupling for
the final: A match of Germany and Spain, the actual final, occurs with the
highest probability of 20.45%. Given this coupling in the final, the winning
probabilities of both teams are given by the Bradley-Terry model (Equa-
tion 4.4) based on the teams’ estimated abilities ability
(BCM )
i . Although
team Germany has a slight advantage with a winning probability of 52.08%,
this essentially conveys that no clear favorite exists in this final. This is con-
firmed by the actual EURO 2008 final which ended with a very close result:
Germany 0, Spain 1.
4.2.5 Discussion
We embedded various methods for rating players/teams in competitive sports
into a common framework that allows for forecasting winning probabilities in
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Figure 4.1: Simulated probabilities (from 100,000 tournament runs based on
the BCM consensus abilities) for reaching the quarter-final, the semi-final,
the final, and for winning the EURO 2008.
sports tournaments (rather than single matches) and obtaining the competi-
tors’ underlying strengths/abilities. The link between abilities and winning
probabilities is established by means of a simulation approach that takes
into account potential tournament effects such as group draws or seedings.
Specifically, these methods are applied to the World Football Elo rating and
the odds from a set of international bookmakers and assessed using forecasts
of the European football championship 2008. A consensus model for the
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bookmakers odds performs best in this comparison, correctly predicting the
actual final of the tournament and revealing clear tournament effects due to
the group draw.
Although the model forecasts provide promising results for the EURO 2008,
various improvements are conceivable and deserve further study: The tour-
nament simulation could be enhanced to provide not only winners and losers
but more realistic results (such as goals or goal differences in a soccer tourna-
ment). The bookmaker consensus model adopted here only includes a fixed
team effect but could be extended to encompass further fixed or random ef-
fects capturing, for example, group strengths, bookmaker bias, or differences
in variance.
Furthermore, our results convey that the prospective rating based on ag-
gregated expert judgment in the bookmaker consensus model provides more
accurate forecasts of sports tournament outcomes compared to retrospective
ratings that derive current team/player abilities from past performances. Ap-
plication of both approaches to future tournaments will continue to explore
the potential of these methods and help to establish a more complete picture.
4.3 Wimbledon 2009
Furthermore, we apply our general model framework for bookmakers odds
stemming from a variety of bookmakers (Equation 4.3) to the Men’s singles
of Wimbledon 2009. Wimbledon is the oldest tennis tournament, being held
at the All England Club in the London suburb of Wimbledon since 1877. It
is the most popular tournament played on grass in the world and belongs to
the four annual major tennis tournaments, the Grand Slams, along with the
Australian Open, the French Open and the US Open (Wimbledon, 2009).
In the Men’s singles of Wimbledon 2009 the top seeded and defending cham-
pion Rafael Nadal withdrew from the tournament due to injury days prior to
the tournament. Here, we analyze the effects of this withdrawal, especially
on the expected ability of the bookmakers’ favorite Federer.
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This section is organized as follows: Section 4.3.1 provides a data and tour-
nament description of Wimbledon 2009 for which the players’ abilities are
modeled and analyzed in Section 4.3.2. Section 4.3.3 concludes the analysis
of Wimbeldon 2009.
4.3.1 Wimbledon 2009: Tournament and Data De-
scription
The tournament
In the Men’s Singles of Wimbledon 2009, a total of 128 international tennis
players compete in a single elimination tournament modus (knockout system)
to determine the “best” tennis player on grass. Players wishing to enter Wim-
bledon are required to submit their entry on a special form. The organizing
committee evaluates all applications for entry, and use ATP rankings to de-
termine which players will be admitted directly into the tournament, those
who have to qualify and those who are rejected. A player without a high
enough ATP ranking can be admitted as a “wild card” by the committee.
Wild cards are usually offered on the basis of past performance at Wimble-
don or to increase British interest. A player who neither has a high enough
ranking nor receives a wild card can participate in a qualifying tournament
(a three-round event) held one week before Wimbledon. The players who
win all three rounds will progress. “Lucky losers” are losers from the final
round of qualifying competitions — chosen in order of ATP rankings — to fill
any vacancy which occurs in the draw before the first round has been com-
pleted. The committee seeds the top 32 players based on their ATP rankings
in order to make sure that the top 32 players do not meet each other in the
tournament before the third round. The seedings can also be changed due to
players’ previous grass court performance by the committee (see Wimbledon,
2009).
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Data
Bookmakers Odds. Long-term odds of winning Wimbledon 2009 (Men’s
Singles) were obtained from the website http://odds.bestbetting.com
which compares odds of a variety of international bookmakers. We obtained
all available odds on two different dates, 2009-06-16 (before the tournament
draw and before Nadal’s withdrawal; henceforth called W1) and on 2009-
06-22 (before the tournament started, but after the draw; henceforth called
W2). The first dataset contains odds of 17 international bookmakers for
96 players who are expected to participate in Wimbledon 2009. The latter
dataset contains odds of 15 international bookmakers for 105 participating
players.
In order to recover the underlying beliefs of the bookmakers, we adjust the
quoted odds as described above (4.1). This adjustment is done separately for
all bookmakers yielding bookmaker-specific overrounds and expected winning
probabilities pi,b for each player i and bookmaker b derived from the adjusted
odds.
ATP Rankings (Singles). The South African Airways ATP rankings
(singles) is based on the players’ results (measured in points) at the four
Grand Slams, the eight mandatory ATP World Tour Masters 1000 tourna-
ments and the Barclays ATP World Tour Finals of the ranking period, and
the best four results from all ATP World Tour 500 tournaments played in
the calendar year. We obtained the points assigned to the rankings (hence-
forth called ATP ratings) from 2009-06-22 from ATP’s website for all 128
participating players and for the injured player Rafael Nadal (Association of
Tennis Professionals, 2009).
Seeding and Draw for Wimbledon 2009. As described above, the
Wimbledon organizing committee seeds the top 32 players of the tournament
based on their ATP rankings and their previous grass court performance. We
obtained the seeding for Wimbledon 2009 from 2009-06-17 and from 2009-
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06-19 (after Nadal’s withdrawal) from the Wimbledon webpage (Wimbledon,
2009). Additionally, we obtained the draw from 2009-06-19. According to
the Wimbledon seeding from 2009-06-17 Nadal was the top seeded player,
followed by Federer, Murray, Djokovic, and Del Potro. Due to Nadal’s with-
drawal after the draw, the committee left the top position blank, and seeded
the previously unseeded player Kiefer as 33 and included Thiago Alves as
a lucky loser to the draw. The draw changed in that way, that Del Potro
(seeded on 5) took the place from Nadal, Blake seeded as 17 took Del Potro’s
place, and Kiefer took Blake’s place.
4.3.2 Modeling Players’ Abilities
The focus here is to analyze the effect of Nadal’s withdrawal from Wimble-
don 2009, especially on the expected abilities of the main competitor Federer.
It is obvious that Nadal’s withdrawal increases, on average, the chance of
winning the tournament of all other players. However, the ability/strength
of each player should not change. Thus, the winning probability for a spe-
cific match, e.g., Federer beating Murray in a potential Wimbledon 2009
final, should not be affected by Nadal’s withdrawal. The “true” abilities of
the players are unknown, but an approximation can be derived from perfor-
mance measures or winning expectancies, like the ATP rating, the seedings,
or the bookmakers odds. Here, we compare all three rating strategies in a
forecasting study for Wimbledon 2009. Aa above, we find that a consen-
sus derived from the (prospective) bookmakers odds has higher predictive
power than retrospective ratings based on historical results (in this study,
the Wimbledon seeding and the ATP rankings, see Table 4.4). Subsequently,
we estimate players’ abilities based on bookmakers odds using two different
odds sets: one including winning expectancies for Nadal and one obtained
after his withdrawal. The resulting expected abilities are compared to assess
the effect on Nadal’s withdrawal. Furthermore, we use the players’ abilities
in order to compare different tournament designs in a simulation study.
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Consensus Information
Since the bookmakers’ expectations about Wimbledon 2009 are rather homo-
geneous, we use again the very straightforward aggregation strategy comput-
ing the means of the winning logits (i.e., winning log-odds) to find appropriate
consensus measures of all bookmakers:
̂logit(pi) =
1
B
B∑
b=1
logit (pi,b) , (4.12)
where B is the number of bookmakers.
Transforming these consensus winning logits back to the probability scale
yields the bookmakers’ consensus winning probabilities p̂i for each player i
for whom odds are available.
Table 4.3 shows the estimated winning probabilities p̂i and their associ-
ated winning logits ̂logit(pi) of the top ten participating players of Wim-
bledon 2009 using the winning odds W1 and W2.
According to the BCM for W1 and W2, Federer has the highest chance of
winning Wimbledon 2009 (W1: 38.52%, and W2: 45.95%). Federer, is fol-
lowed by Murray with a clear distance (W1: 18.31%, and W2: 23.00%). The
expected winning probability of the top seeded player Nadal is clearly below
the top two (14.19%). His withdrawal increases the winning probabilities of
both players strongly, whereas the winning probabilities of all other players
do not change as clearly.
In order to test the predictive power of the bookmaker consensus we compare
the consensus winning logits including the last available information (W2)
with the actual tournament outcome, the Wimbledon seeding, and the ATP
ranking of the top ten players using Spearman’s rank correlation (Table 4.4).
Although the correlation between the bookmaker consensus winning proba-
bilities and the actual tournament outcome is rather low (0.109) the BCM
still performs better than the Wimbledon seeding (−0.156) and the ATP
ranking (−0.185). Both, the seeding and the ATP ranking have a negative
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p̂i(%) ̂logit(pi) log(ability i) p˜i(%)
W1 W2 W1 W2 W1 W2 W1 W2
Federer 38.52 45.95 −0.47 −0.16 −3.63 −3.32 38.68 46.17
Murray 18.31 23.00 −1.50 −1.21 −4.41 −4.03 18.50 23.04
Nadal 14.19 −1.80 −4.49 14.40
Djokovic 5.94 5.68 −2.76 −2.81 −4.67 −4.75 6.09 5.84
Roddick 2.53 3.30 −3.65 −3.38 −5.05 −4.88 2.62 3.50
Del Potro 2.74 3.03 −3.57 −3.47 −5.07 −4.91 2.96 3.29
Tsonga 3.33 3.01 −3.37 −3.47 −4.91 −4.84 3.49 3.16
So¨derling 1.84 1.29 −3.98 −4.34 −5.07 −5.07 2.04 1.42
Verdasco 1.43 1.22 −4.23 −4.40 −5.34 −5.23 1.61 1.38
Haas 0.81 1.12 −4.81 −4.49 −5.65 −5.33 1.01 1.27
Hewitt 0.43 0.78 −5.44 −4.84 −5.38 −5.30 0.62 0.92
Table 4.3: Estimated winning probabilities p̂i, their associated winning log-
its ̂logit(pi), estimated log-abilities log(ability i) and associated simulated win-
ning probabilities p˜i of the top ten participating players of Wimbledon 2009
and Nadal using their winning odds from 2009-06-16 (W1) and from 2009-
06-22 (W2).
Spearman’s rank correlation with the actual tournament outcome, assigning
rather high ranks to two players who reach the quarter-finals (Hewitt) or the
semi-finals (Haas).
In addition to the correlation, we analyze the correctly predicted partici-
pants of each round (third round to winner). Table 4.5 shows that the BCM
correctly predicts nine players of the last 16, whereas the Wimbledon seed-
ing predicts only seven and the ATP ranking only eight players correctly.
Furthermore, the BCM correctly predicts five of the last eight and three of
the last four, everytime one more than the Wimbledon seeding and the ATP
ranking. All three approaches forecast the actual winner Federer correctly,
but expected Murray who was beaten by Roddick in the semi-finals, as the
runner-up.
Nevertheless, the ex post analysis shows that the correlation between the
bookmakers expectancies for Wimbledon 2009 and the actual tournament
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BCM Seeding ATP
Tournament ranking 0.109 −0.156 −0.185
BCM 0.688 0.792
Seeding 0.956
Table 4.4: Spearman’s rank correlation between the actual tournament rank-
ing and rankings according to the estimated BCM winning probabilities, the
seeding, and the ATP rating of the top ten participating players of Wimble-
don 2009.
Round of last . . .
16 8 4 2 1
BCM 9 5 3 1 1
Seeding 7 4 2 1 1
ATP 8 4 2 1 1
Table 4.5: Correctly prediction of the last 16, 8, 4, 2, and the winner using the
(log-)abilities, the seeding, and the ATP raking of the top 128 participating
players of Wimbledon 2009.
outcome is not high, but the bookmakers perform better than the Wimbledon
seeding and the ATP ranking. The reasons for the difficulties in forecasting
tennis are twofold. First, tennis is an individual sport competition and the
outcome of a match/tournament depend only on one individual who can
easily have a day off or an injury rather than a whole team. Second, in
the tennis tournament design (single elimination tournament) every single
match is important, if a player loses one match he is eliminated from the
tournament.
Estimation of Abilities
With the winning logits and associated winning probabilities we have com-
puted measures for the specific tournament, Wimbledon 2009, including in-
formation about the tournament design (in W1 and W2) and including the
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original draw (in W2). In order to obtain measures of the unknown “true”
abilities of the players we have to adjust the winning logits by the tournament
effects (tournament schedule and draw). I.e., we try to estimate the abilities
which correspond with the winning logits. For this we employ again the well
known Bradley and Terry (1952) model which measures abilities on a ratio
scale and for which the probability pii,j for competitor i beating competitor j
is given by:
pii,j =
ability i
ability i + ability j
(i 6= j), (4.13)
where ability i is the ability for competitor i.
Given the abilities of all players and the tournament schedule, we can com-
pute the associated winning probabilities based on the pairwise probabilities
from Equation 4.13. Alternatively, we can simulate a large number of tour-
nament runs (100,000 say) and then assessing the empirical winning pro-
portions p˜ for each competitor (see 4.2.1). I.e., for given abilities ability i
(i = 1, . . . , 128) for all competitors we obtain the simulated winning proba-
bility p˜(ability)i for competitor i. We can try to estimate the unknown “true”
abilities by choosing them in a way that the p˜(ability)i match the Bookmaker
Consensus Model winning probabilities pi as closely as possible. In our case,
we minimize the total absolute deviation between p and p˜, i.e., we solve the
optimization for
ability = argmin
ability
n∑
i=1
|pi − p˜ (ability)i| , (4.14)
using a local search strategy.
In order to estimate the ability for each player, we need winning logits for all
players. Due to the fact that not all players are assigned to odds, we do not
obtain winning logits for all players derived from the BCM. Therefore, we
use a simple linear model modeling the relationship between the ATP ratings
on the log-scale and the consensus winning logits:
logit(pi) = β0 + β1 · log(ATP), (4.15)
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and predicted the consensus winning logits of the “unrated” players. The
relationships have a high correlation for both W1 and W2 (W1: 0.828, W2:
0.836). and the estimated model parameters for the slope β1 and the in-
tercept β0 are 1.73 and −18.79 for W1, and 1.71 and −18.66 for W2. For
ease of comparison, we show the estimated abilities on the log-scale and their
associated simulated winning probabilities p˜i (which match the winning prob-
abilities p̂i derived from the BCM) of the top players of Wimbledon 2009 for
W1 and W2 in Table 4.3. According to the estimated log-abilities Federer is
still the best player of Wimbledon 2009 (W1: −3.627, W2: −3.315), followed
again by Murray (W1:−4.409, W2: −4.030). If Nadal had played Wimble-
don 2009, he was expected to be the third strongest player of the tournament
(W1: −4.492, with an associated simulated winning probability of 14.40%).
In order to assess whether the ability of a player was altered due to Nadal’s
withdrawal, we compare the players estimated log-abilities by subtracting the
log-abilities of a reference player. We choose So¨derling, because he has rather
similar log-abilities for W1 and W2. Thus, Figure 4.2 shows for each top ten
player if the chance of beating So¨derling increases or decreases after Nadal’s
withdrawal. The comparison of the log-abilities shows that the abilities of
almost all top ten players (except Djokovic) increases, but primarily the
abilities of Federer, Murray, and Haas. E.g., the probability that Federer
beat So¨derling increases from 80.84% to 85.25%.
The changes in the (log)abilities of the top two, Federer and Murray, show
that the bookmakers do not react on Nadal’s withdrawal and its consequen-
tial changes of the draw as expected. Apparently, they have not considered
the whole tournament again and instead just increased Federer’s and Mur-
ray’s winning probabilities—presumably because they expected much more
punters betting on a tournament by one of the two players. In any case,
this explanation for the increase in Federer’s and Murray’s expected abilities
seems to be far more plausible than interpreting the results literally as an
increase in their abilities. In the latter case, one would have to argue that
Federer and Murray are so relieved by the drop-out of Nadal that they even
play stronger in matches against other players (such as So¨derling). Further-
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Figure 4.2: Comparison of the estimated log-abilities log(ability i) of the top
ten participating players of Wimbledon 2009 using the winning odds from
2009-06-16 (W1) and from 2009-06-22 (W2).
more, the changes in the abilities of Haas and Djokovic can be explained by
a delayed reaction to the outcome of the Wimbledon warm up tournament in
Halle, where Haas beat Djokovic rather clearly (6-3 6-7(4) 6-1) in the final.
Although this information had already been available at time W1, it appears
to have only been used in the odds at time W2—potentially due to a change
in the punters’ betting behavior in the week between the tournaments of
Halle and Wimbledon.
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Effects of the Tournament Design
With the estimated abilities of the players a measure adjusted for the tour-
nament effects is now available and we are able to determine the effects of
different tournament designs by simulating winning probabilities of all par-
ticipants. A tennis tournament is typically a single elimination tournament
and so each match plays an important role. A player with the ambition of
winning the tournament is not able to have a day off. Furthermore, in a
tennis tournament like Wimbledon a specific number of players is seeded.
In order to determine the effects of the tennis tournament with its seeding, we
compare three different designs: (1) a single elimination tournament with the
original seeding and draw of Wimbledon 2009, (2) a single elimination tourna-
ment without seeding and random draw, and (3) a round-robin tournament,
where each player plays each other ones. We use the estimated abilities from
all 128 players of Wimbledon 2009 derived from the BCM (W2) and simulate
their chances of winning the tournament according to the above described
simulation approach (100,000 runs). For comparison reason we transform
the empirical propabilities into winning logits and compare them for the
top ten players in Figure 4.3. The winning logits of the single elimination
tournament with seeding and without seeding differ not really much. Only
some winning logits slightly increase (for a few of the weaker players) and
some slightly decrease (e.g., Murrary and Djokovic) if the single elimination
tournament is played without seeding. However, overall these differences are
minor signalling that in the long run, the seeding does not have a large effect
on the tournament outcome. In contrast, if we consider a round-robin where
instead of 127 matches 8128 matches have to be played, the winning proba-
bility of the player with the highest ability (here: Federer) increases strongly
compared to the single elimination tournaments. The winning logits of all
other players (except the second strongest player Murray) decrease sharply.
In general, we can conclude that a single elimination tournament is clearly
more exciting than a round-robin tournament. Whereas in a round-robin
with 128 players each player has to play 127 matches, in a single elimination
tournament the final participants have to play seven matches. Nevertheless,
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Figure 4.3: Winning probabilities of the top ten players simulated by three
different tournament designs (single elimination tournament with seeding,
single elimination tournament without seeding and a round-robin tourna-
ment) using the estimated abilities of all 128 participating players of Wim-
bledon 2009.
a round-robin tournament would be more favorable to top players.
4.3.3 Discussion
In this application we investigate a strategy for estimating the expected play-
ers’ abilities of a tennis tournament (Wimbledon 2009) using bookmakers ex-
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pectancies for winning the tournament. A comparison of the estimated abili-
ties for two datasets incorporating different information about the (expected)
participants of the tournament shows that the bookmakers do not react ap-
propriately on a rapid change of the tournament (here: Nadal’s withdrawal).
The abilities of the main competitors (Federer and Murray) increase. We
also investigate the effect of the tournament schedule on top players’ chances
of winning the tournament by a simulation study, comparing three different
tournament designs.
4.4 UEFA Champions League 2008/09
In the next application we extend the general model framework for bookmak-
ers odds stemming from a variety of bookmakers and model the bookmakers
consensus as well as the (dis)agreement across the bookmakers for the UEFA
Champions League 2008/09.
This section is organized as follows: Section 4.4.1 provides a tournament
and data description for the UEFA Champions League 2008/09 for which
the bookmakers consensus and agreement are modeled in Section 4.4.2 and
analyzed in Section 4.4.3. Section 4.4.4 concludes the paper.
4.4.1 UEFA Champions League 2008/09: Tournament
and data description
The tournament
The UEFA Champions League is the most prestigious club competition of
the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) and so one of the most
popular annual sports tournaments all over the world. Every year, a selection
of European football clubs compete in a multi-stage modus (qualification,
group, and knockout stage) to determine the “best” European team. First,
32 teams are determined via three qualification rounds for the group stage
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and drawn into eight groups (A–H). The number of eligible teams is deter-
mined by UEFA’s Coefficient Ranking System for its member associations
(see below, for more details). In the 2008/09 season, teams from 17 asso-
ciations out of UEFA’s 53 members qualified for the group stage. The four
teams of each group play a round-robin—every team plays every other team
twice (one home and one away match), for a total of twelve games within
the group—and the group winners and runners-up advance to the knockout
stages. In the knock-out stage, each round pairings are determined by means
of a draw and played under the cup (knock-out) system, on a home-and-away
basis, where the winners advance to the next round until two teams remain.
The two teams play the final as one single match at a neutral venue yielding
the winner of the UEFA Champions League (Union of European Football
Associations, 2009b).
Data
Bookmakers odds. Long-term odds of winning the UEFA Champions
League 2008/09 were obtained from the websites of 31 international book-
makers for all 32 participating teams on 2008-09-01 (before the tournament
started, but after the group draw). The 31 bookmakers are all bookmakers
who offer odds for this event out of 50 European top-selling online sports
bookmakers. The odds are again adjusted by removing the stake and a
bookmaker-specific overround (see Equation 4.1) and then transformed to
winning probabilities by means of Equation 4.2. This yields tournament
winning probabilities pi,b for i = 1, . . . , 16 teams and b = 1, . . . , 32 bookmak-
ers which reflect the bookmakers’ beliefs about the outcome of the UEFA
Champions League 2008/09. Figure 4.4 shows the quoted odds (on a log-
axis) for all 32 participating teams of the UEFA Champions League 2008/09
by the 31 bookmakers. It can be seen that the heterogeneity increases along
with the level of the quotes odds.
For our dataset we obtain a mean overround of 23.58% across all bookmakers
with an interquartile range from 19.71% to 26.89%.
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Figure 4.4: Quoted odds (on log-axis) for all 32 participating teams of the
UEFA Champions League 2008/09 by the 31 bookmakers.
UEFA’s club coefficient and seeding. The UEFA also announces their
expectancies for the tournament outcome prior to the tournament by pub-
lishing a group draw seeding which is a ranking that is very similar to the
ranking of UEFA’s club coefficient of the teams. The UEFA’s club coefficient
is determined by the results of a club in European club competitions in the
last five seasons, and the league coefficient. The latter is also used to deter-
mine the number of eligible teams for the UEFA Champions League where
the best three associations have four teams in the tournament (for more de-
tails see Union of European Football Associations, 2009b). We obtained the
UEFA’s club coefficient and seeding for the group draw on 2008-08-28 from
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UEFA’s website for all 32 participating teams and, in Section 4.4.3, compare
both to the ranking derived from the bookmakers’ consensus forecast.
4.4.2 Modeling consensus and agreement
Model class
In order to model the expected winning probabilities pi,b for each team i =
1, . . . , 32 and bookmaker b = 1, . . . , 31, as derived from the raw quoted odds,
straightforward linear models are not appropriate as the pi,b necessarily lie
within the unit interval. Therefore, we follow the standard technique of
employing a suitable link function to transform probabilities to the real line
and then using linear models for the transformed data. Various link functions
are conceivable; standard choices include the logit or probit link function. In
the following, we employ the logit link throughout; using the probit link
instead would lead to qualitatively similar results.
On the transformed logit scale, an intuitive and straightforward strategy
would be to compute team-wise means for the consensus and team-wise stan-
dard deviations for the disagreement across bookmakers (as suggested by,
e.g., Zarnowitz and Lambros, 1987). In our application, this simple strategy
might be appropriate because we could expect the teams to be sufficiently
different and the bookmakers to have rather similar information about the
teams. However, from a statistical point of view one should investigate
whether this simple strategy is sufficient or can be improved by including
additional effects (e.g., pertaining to the bookmakers), or by using a more
parsimonious parametrization still giving a good approximation of the un-
derlying data-generating process. Therefore, we propose a stochastic model
class that captures the underlying probability distribution on a logit scale
and contains the simple strategy as a special case. We assume additive and
normally distributed “errors” on the logit scale, providing a natural way for
assessment of means and variances in the models.
The model relates the expected winning logits logit(pi,b) to the (unobservable)
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“true” winning logits logit(pi) for team i, reflecting the bookmakers consen-
sus, plus an additional (unobservable) normally-distributed error term i,b of
bookmaker b for team i, reflecting the disagreement across the bookmakers.
In order to capture these latent quantities by a linear mixed-effects model,
we allow the true winning logits to depend on a team effect αi, an associa-
tion effect βa(i) for association a of team i, as well as an overall intercept ν.
The error can additionally depend on µb, the mean effect of bookmaker b.
We allow also different specifications of the deviation i,b of bookmaker b for
team i. In summary, this can be written as
logit(pi,b) = logit(pi) + i,b (4.16)
= ν + αi + βa(i) + µb + σi,bZi,b, (4.17)
where Zi,b is a standardized error and σi,b is the standard deviation which can
be either constant (σi,b = σ), or constant within a specific group (σi,b = σi:
team-specific standard deviation; σi,b = σb: bookmaker-specific; or σi,b =
σa(i): association-specific). Even if contrasts are employed, this model is
overspecified when all three effects αi, βa(i), and µb are included as fixed
effects due to the dependence of association a(i) on the team i.
In order to overcome this methodological issue, there are various conceiv-
able solutions which can also be motivated by subject-matter considerations:
(a) The association effects could be omitted signalling that all teams are suffi-
ciently different. Note that the full team effect then still captures association
differences. (b) Alternatively, the team effect could be specified as a random
effect (with zero mean) conveying that the winning logits for each team de-
viate randomly from the mean as captured by the remaining effects (e.g., by
fixed association differences). (c) A random effect for the bookmakers would
be conceivable implying that the bookmakers’ odds deviate randomly from
the mean as captured by the remaining effects. (d) Finally, the four different
specifications of the deviation i,b of bookmaker b for team i represent differ-
ent views on the sources of variation and thus disagreement. For example,
even if there is a fixed team effect αi in the consensus, it would be conceivable
that the amount of disagreement is only driven by the team’s association be-
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cause bookmakers might have a similar degree of information about teams in
the same association. Combinations of the ideas (a)–(d) lead to 20 different
mixed-effects models. Table 4.6 specifies the different effects and standard
deviations of i,b for each model. In order to find a parsimonious model which
still gives a good approximation of the underlying data-generating process,
standard model selection methods can be employed. We use the Bayesian
information criterion (BIC; Pinheiro and Bates, 2000).
Model selection
Fitting the 20 conceivable mixed-effects models discussed in the previous sec-
tions yields the results in Table 4.6 which provides the log-likelihood, number
of parameters, and associated BIC. In general, the model selection approach
shows that all models including fixed team effects perform clearly better than
models with a random team effect, even if an additional association effect
is included. Furthermore, the models with constant standard deviation are
worse than all models using other standard deviation specifications. With
respect to the BIC, the best model emerging from Models 1–20 is Model 3
(BIC = 82.13), containing only a fixed team effect (and hence no additional
association) and a team-specific standard deviation. The second best model
(Model 7) includes an additional random effect for the bookmakers, cap-
turing bookmaker differences. The best four models (Models 3, 4, 7, and
8) have a fixed team effect and a team- or association-specific standard de-
viation. In summary, this conveys that, as expected, the main differences
are across individual teams which require a full fixed effect (and can not be
sufficiently captured by more parsimonious parametrizations such as a fixed
association effect plus a random team effect). Furthermore, the fact that the
bookmaker effect can be omitted or captured as a random effect suggests that
there are no large systematic deviations between the bookmakers. Similarly,
a team-specific standard deviation is necessary to obtain the best model fit.
However, models including association-specific standard deviations are only
slightly worse, implying that agreement across bookmakers is driven to a
large extent by the association differences.
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Team Bookmaker Association Deviation logLik df BIC
1 fixed fixed none const −3.20 63 441.09
2 fixed none none const −121.71 33 471.11
3 fixed none none team 179.73 64 82.13
4 fixed none none association 121.48 49 95.12
5 fixed random none const −51.88 34 338.34
6 fixed random none bookmaker 12.61 64 416.37
7 fixed random none team 179.73 65 89.03
8 fixed random none association 121.63 50 101.72
9 random fixed none const −130.99 33 489.68
10 random fixed fixed const −96.30 49 530.69
11 random fixed none bookmaker −69.91 63 574.51
12 random fixed fixed bookmaker −35.35 79 615.78
13 random fixed none team 59.08 64 323.41
14 random fixed fixed team 93.68 80 364.62
15 random fixed none association 12.88 49 312.32
16 random fixed fixed association 47.49 65 353.50
17 random none none const −245.68 3 512.05
18 random none none bookmaker −163.39 33 554.47
19 random none none team 46.04 34 142.51
20 random none none association −10.33 19 151.75
21 fixed none none linear 83.35 34 67.88
22 fixed none none power 113.47 35 14.56
Table 4.6: Effect and standard deviation specifications of the mixed-effects
models for logit(pi,b) of team i by bookmaker b. Each model is evaluated by
the log-likelihood value (logLik), the number of estimated parameters (df),
and the BIC.
Model 3 confirms the simple strategy of employing team-specific means for
the consensus and team-specific standard deviations for agreement across
bookmakers. It is reassuring that this intuitive model has been selected from
a more general class of models, where some of the alternatives would have
also had appealing interpretations. In Section 4.4.3 it is shown how the
parametrization of the standard deviation can be made more parsimonious
while retaining the same consensus (Models 21 and 22 of Table 4.6).
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4.4.3 Analysis of the UEFA Champi-
ons League 2008/09
Consensus
The bookmaker consensus for the UEFA Champions League 2008/09 can be
derived from the best model (Model 3) by using the estimated winning logits
logit(p̂i) = ν̂ + α̂i which equal the team-specific means of the winning logits
across the bookmakers for each team (= 1/31
∑31
b=1 logit(pi,b)). This consen-
sus information on the logit scale can easily be transformed to the associated
winning probabilities p̂i of winning the tournament for all 32 participating
teams which are shown in Table 4.7. Additionally, the eight origin groups of
the preliminaries, and the football association of the teams are shown.
Chelsea FC is seen as the best team of the 32 teams and has the highest
probability (13.52%) of winning the tournament. The expected runner-up
(if the tournament schedule allows such a final) comes also from England,
Manchester United FC (winning probability: 12.00%). The top two are fol-
lowed by the champion of the “Serie A” FC Internazionale Milano (10.10%)
and the champion of the “Primera Division” FC Barcelona (10.05%). The
last four teams are participating for the first time in the tournament and have
just a winning probability of 0.20% or less. Four teams out of the first seven
ranked teams are from England which implies that England is the strongest
European association. Three teams out of the first eleven are members of
group H, but only two of them can advance to the next round. Using the
group information in combination with the winning probabilities of the par-
ticipating teams (Table 4.7) the following 16 teams (eight group-winners and
eight runners-up) are expected to play the first knock-out round: Chelsea
FC, AS Roma (group A), FC Internazionale Milano, Werder Bremen (B),
FC Barcelona, FC Shakhtar Donetsk (C), Liverpool FC, Club Atle´tico de
Madrid (D), Manchester United FC, Villarreal GF (E), FC Bayern Mu¨nchen,
Olympique Lyonnais (F), Arsenal FC, FC Porto (G), Real Madrid CF, and
Juventus (H). These 16 teams are not the 16 participants with the highest
winning probabilities implying that the group drawn has an effect to the
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tournament outcome. In summary, the bookmaker consensus gives winning
probabilities of the teams which can be used to predict the winner of the
tournament. See Section 4.2.1 on how this forecast can be complemented for
dynamics of such tournaments by a simulation approach.
In order to show how well the bookmaker consensus performs in prac-
tice, we compare the forecast with the real outcome of the UEFA Cham-
pions League 2008/09. Table 4.8 assesses the predictive performance of
the bookmaker consensus by comparing them with the actual tournament
outcome using Spearman’s rank correlation. For the actual results, a total
ranking including ties is employed, as commonly used in rankings of such
incomplete tournaments. Various strategies for resolving the ties have been
explored but did not lead to qualitatively different results. In addition, Ta-
ble 4.8 also provides correlations with the ranking implied by the UEFA’s
seeding and UEFA’s club coefficient of the teams (prior to the group drawn).
This shows that the bookmakers consensus has a very high correlation with
the actual outcome (0.798) and performs somewhat better than the rankings
based on the UEFA’s seeding (0.756) and UEFA’s club coefficient (0.754) of
the teams. In particular, the bookmaker consensus correctly predicts three
of four semifinalists (Chelsea FC, Manchester United, FC Barcelona) and 14
of 16 teams which played the first knockout round.
Agreement
In addition to the consensus of the bookmaker we can also derive the team-
specific standard deviations of Model 3. As discussed above, the estimated
standard deviations σ̂i captures the disagreement across the bookmakers. A
low standard deviation for a team reflects a low disagreement across the
bookmakers, whereas a high standard deviation implies a high disagreement
across the bookmakers. The standard deviations σi for team i for all 32 par-
ticipating teams are shown in Table 4.7.
In general, the team-specific standard deviations are low implying a low dis-
agreement across the 31 bookmakers. The team with the lowest disagreement
88
across the bookmakers is one of the top teams, FC Barcelona, with a stan-
dard deviation of 0.065 on the logit scale. Conversely, the team with the
highest disagreement (standard deviation 0.494) is Aalborg BK which has a
low consensus winning probability. Taking a closer look (see Figure 4.5), we
can see that the agreement increases with increasing winning logits of the
teams. By exploiting this information, our current best model (Model 3)
can be improved further by fitting a relationship between the team-specific
standard deviations and the fitted values on the logit scale:
σi,b = σi = γ1 + γ2logit (pi)
γ3 , (4.18)
where γ1, γ2, and γ3 are the function parameters which are estimated by the
model (jointly along with the parameters specifying the consensus logit(pi)).
In addition to the power specification above we also investigate a linear spec-
ification (γ3 = 1). By using a linear relationship a much more parsimonious
model, reducing the number of estimated parameters from 64 (32 + 32) to
34 (32 + 2) and improving the model selection criteria (BIC = 67.88) can be
fitted (see Model 21 of Table 4.6). The estimated function parameters of the
linear relationship are: γ1 = 0.000 and γ2 = 0.055. By estimating one more
model parameter for the power γ3 of a non-linear relationship the model can
be improved again yielding a BIC of 14.56 (see Model 22 of Table 4.6). The
estimated function parameters of the non-linear relationship are: γ1 = 0.065,
γ2 = 0.005, and γ3 = 2.375. Figure 4.5 shows the team-specific relationship
of Model 3 (points), as well as the linear relationship of Model 21 (dashed
line) and the non-linear relationship of Model 22 (solid line). Note that in
all three models (Models 3, 21, and 22) all parameters are estimated simul-
taneously yielding the same estimated bookmaker consensus, but different
specifications of disagreement across the bookmakers.
Team’s association
According to the bookmaker consensus (Table 4.7) four teams out of the
first seven ranked teams are from England which implies that England is
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Figure 4.5: Relationship between the estimated bookmaker consensus
logit(p̂i) and different specifications of disagreement σ̂i for all 32 partici-
pating teams of the UEFA Champions League 2008/09. The points show
the team-specific, the dashed line the linear and the solid line the non-linear
relationship captured by the Models 3, 21 and 22 of Table 4.6.
the strongest European association. But what about the other associations?
The estimated consensus can also be used to rank the 17 associations of the
participating teams. Therefore, we compute the means of the winning log-
its logit(p̂i) of all teams coming from an association a (see Table 4.9). The
difference of these means and the overall mean ν of all 32 participating teams
can be seen as an implied “association effect” on the logit scale. In addition
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to the average consensus of an association, Table 4.9 shows the average dis-
agreement (average standard deviations) and the number of qualified teams
of the 17 associations.
There is a strong correlation between the average consensus on the logit scale
and the number of qualified teams (0.75) implying that strong associations
according to the bookmakers consensus have a higher number of qualified
teams (cf., UEFA’s determination strategy for the number of eligible teams
in Union of European Football Associations, 2009b). England, Spain and
Italy have the maximum number of qualified teams (four), but England with
the highest average consensus on the logit scale (−2.33) is the strongest
European association. Russia with only one team (FC Zenit St. Petersburg)
is rated better than Germany (two teams), France (three teams) and Portugal
(two teams). The association with the weakest (average) consensus is clearly
Belarus where the team with the lowest probability of winning the Champions
League (FC BATE Borisov) comes from.
In addition to the relationship between the association effects and the number
of qualified teams, we can also show the relationship between the agreement
of the teams and their associations. Table 4.9 shows that the disagreement
across the 31 bookmakers is very low for the teams coming from the top three
associations (England, Spain and Italy) and increases with the increasing
average consensus.
4.4.4 Discussion
Based on quoted bookmakers odds for the occurrences of a cer-
tain set of events (such as players/teams winning a particular sports
match/tournament), this section extends the general model class for the un-
known “true” logits of the occurrence of the events. It is applied to the
assessment of consensus and (dis)agreement among 31 international book-
makers for the UEFA Champions League 2008/09. A linear mixed-effects
model framework capturing different effects for the teams, the bookmakers
as well as for the team’s associations and allowing different specifications for
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the standard deviation leads to a variety of models. According to a model
selection approach using the BIC, the natural strategy of using the means
of the winning logits as consensus and the team-specific standard deviation
as measure for disagreement is appropriate. The estimated winning proba-
bilities derived from the bookmaker consensus predicts the actual outcome
very well (correlation of 0.798), somewhat better than UEFA’s expectations
(UEFA’s seeding and UEFA’s club coefficient). In particular, the bookmaker
consensus model correctly predict three of four semifinalists (Chelsea FC,
Manchester United FC, FC Barcelona) and 14 of 16 teams which played the
first knockout round. Furthermore, the analysis of the bookmakers agreement
implies a negative relationship between the estimated winning probabilities
of a team and the disagreement across the bookmakers which can be modeled
by a linear relationship or a non-linear relationship. Both extended models
capturing these relationships reduce the number of estimated parameters of
the model substantially and improve the model selection criteria. By analyz-
ing the team’s associations, we show a strong positive relationship between
the number of teams coming from an association and the average consensus of
the respective association. This reflects UEFA’s strategy of allocating more
fixed and qualifying slots to “stronger” associations. Finally, we find a strong
negative relationship between the disagreement across the bookmakers and
the average consensus of an association.
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p̂i(%) logit(p̂i) σ̂i Group Association
Chelsea FC 13.52 −1.86 0.092 A England
Manchester United FC 12.00 −1.99 0.091 E England
FC Internazionale Milano 10.10 −2.19 0.074 B Italy
FC Barcelona 10.05 −2.19 0.065 C Spain
Real Madrid CF 9.40 −2.27 0.157 H Spain
Arsenal FC 6.41 −2.68 0.111 G England
Liverpool FC 5.86 −2.78 0.109 D England
FC Bayern Mu¨nchen 4.62 −3.03 0.119 F Germany
Juventus 3.88 −3.21 0.107 H Italy
AS Roma 3.32 −3.37 0.085 A Italy
FC Zenit St. Petersburg 2.52 −3.66 0.213 H Russia
Olympique Lyonnais 2.49 −3.67 0.108 F France
Club Atle´tico de Madrid 2.20 −3.80 0.175 D Spain
Villarreal CF 1.96 −3.91 0.157 E Spain
ACF Fiorentina 1.50 −4.19 0.173 F Italy
Werder Bremen 1.32 −4.32 0.245 B Germany
FC Porto 1.20 −4.41 0.319 G Portugal
Olympique de Marseille 0.82 −4.79 0.286 D France
Fenerbahc¸e SK 0.76 −4.87 0.151 G Turkey
PSV Eindhoven 0.69 −4.98 0.312 D Netherlands
FC Girondins de Bordeaux 0.62 −5.07 0.385 A France
FC Shakhtar Donetsk 0.61 −5.09 0.333 C Ukraine
Sporting Clube de Portugal 0.58 −5.14 0.321 C Portugal
Panathinaikos FC 0.58 −5.15 0.261 B Greece
FC Dynamo Kyiv 0.50 −5.29 0.437 G Ukraine
Celtic FC 0.49 −5.32 0.221 E Scotland
FC Steaua Bucurest¸i 0.32 −5.74 0.457 F Romania
FC Basel 1893 0.21 −6.14 0.417 C Switzerland
CFR 1907 Cluj 0.21 −6.18 0.456 A Romania
Aalborg BK 0.14 −6.56 0.494 E Denmark
Anorthosis Famagusta FC 0.11 −6.82 0.336 B Cyprus
FC BATE Borisov 0.10 −6.87 0.405 H Belarus
Table 4.7: Estimated winning probabilities p̂i, associated winning logits
logit(p̂i) (reflecting the bookmakers consensus), and standard deviations σ̂i
(reflecting the agreement across the bookmakers) for all 32 participating
teams of the UEFA Champions League 2008/09. Additionally, the eight ori-
gin groups of the preliminaries, and the football association of the teams are
shown.
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Bookmaker Seeding Coefficient
Tournament ranking 0.798 0.756 0.754
Bookmaker 0.843 0.841
Seeding 0.996
Table 4.8: Spearman’s rank correlation between the actual tournament rank-
ing, the ranking of the bookmaker consensus, the UEFA’s seeding and the
UEFA’s club coefficient of the 32 participating teams.
No. of teams Av. consensus Av. disagreement
England 4 −2.33 0.101
Spain 4 −3.04 0.139
Italy 4 −3.24 0.110
Russia 1 −3.66 0.213
Germany 2 −3.67 0.182
France 3 −4.51 0.260
Portugal 2 −4.78 0.320
Turkey 1 −4.87 0.151
Netherlands 1 −4.98 0.312
Greece 1 −5.15 0.261
Ukraine 2 −5.19 0.385
Scotland 1 −5.32 0.221
Romania 2 −5.96 0.456
Switzerland 1 −6.14 0.417
Denmark 1 −6.56 0.494
Cyprus 1 −6.82 0.336
Belarus 1 −6.87 0.405
Table 4.9: Number of qualified teams, average consensus (in winning logits)
and average disagreement (average standard deviation) for the 17 associa-
tions of all 32 participating teams of the UEFA Champions League 2008/09.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
This dissertation introduces a new general framework modeling common rat-
ing processes in order to aggregate rating information stemming from a vari-
ety of raters or rating sources. The current literature do not provide a viable
strategy to solve this aggregation problem.
In order to model the rating processes, our general model framework is based
on the assumption that raters estimate a numerical variable—representing
information about the underlying rating subject—in an internal rating pro-
cess. Due to general informational asymmetry between the rater and the
rating subject the rater cannot estimate the “true” numerical variable. So
we model the numerical variable as a latent variable. Rating outcomes from
different sources are treated as noisy estimations/observations of this latent
variable. In order to estimate the latent variable the distribution of the la-
tent variable, the formal relation by which the noise or error terms are linked
to the latent variable, and the distribution of the error terms have to be
specified. In addition to the latent variable, the means and (co)variances
of these distributions are the key outcome of the model. The mean and
variance of the rating errors can then be used to validate the underlying rat-
ing processes. Furthermore, the estimates of the latent variable denoted as
consensus information can be used for forecasting issues.
In order to show the performance of this general model framework, we model
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two common rating processes: the credit ratings and the bookmakers odds.
In particular, we apply the proposed model to five different applications
yielding different model specifications.
The first application investigate a static latent variable model for a multi-
rater panel provided by the Austrian central bank where PD estimates are
observed for a variety of obligors by 13 banks. In order to estimate the pa-
rameters of the distributions of the errors and latent PDs standard maximum
likelihood techniques is used. The results of this empirical example show that
the framework is suitable to identify bank specific regularities with respect
to grouping variables, like industry affiliation, legal form and exposure size,
and to conduct an outlier analysis of the estimated rating errors of individual
banks.
In the second application we extend the static latent variable model form the
first application to a dynamic latent variable model for ordinal rating infor-
mation. Here, the true unobservable numerical variable is treated as a latent
variable and its dynamic is modeled by using systematic (latent market fac-
tor) as well as idiosyncratic changes. This model is then used to aggregate
the rating information of the bigthree external credit rating agencies (Stan-
dard&Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch) and to validate their rating behavior. Due
to the complexity of this model, Bayesian techniques is employed to estimate
the model’s parameter. We infer from the different rating biases and stan-
dard deviations of the rating errors that there are important differences in
the rating systems/rating behavior of the three rating agencies. For the rat-
ings of the iTraxx Europe firms, Standard&Poor’s has the smallest absolute
rating bias from the consensus. Whereas Moody’s clearly seems to be too
favorable in its credit assessment, Fitch might exhibit a more conservative
rating behavior of these firms. Furthermore, we show that the estimated
latent market and the time-dependent mean score of all consensus scores are
highly correlated with the Dow Jones EURO STOXX 50 index (used as a
reference market).
For the next three applications, the general model framework is applied to
bookmakers odds in order to forecast the outcome and analyze the bookmak-
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ers agreement of three very popular sport tournaments, the UEFA EURO
2008, Wimbledon 2009, and the UEFA Champions League 2008/09.
For the UEFA EURO 2008, one of the world’s biggest sports events that
took place in June 2008 in Austria and Switzerland, the quoted bookmakers
odds for all 16 participating teams by 45 international bookmakers prior to
the tournament are used. The main outcome of the model is the bookmaker
consensus which is used to predict the winner of the EURO 2008. The book-
maker consensus is compared to the forecasts from the World Football Elo
rating and the ranking implied by the FIFA/Coca Cola World rating. In
this ex post comparison, the bookmaker consensus performs best and pre-
dicts the correct final (Germany vs. Spain). Furthermore, the results provide
many further insights into the effects of the group draw in the tournament,
clearly showing that the two finalists come from groups with relatively weak
competitors.
In the next application the general model framework for bookmakers odds
stemming from a variety of bookmakers is applied to a very popular tennis
tournament, the Men’s singles of Wimbledon 2009. After showing that the
bookmakers odds which are prospective ratings of the participating players’
performance perform better, in terms of forecasting the tournament outcome,
than the Wimbledon seeding and the ATP ranking, we estimate the abilities
of each participating player for two different odds sets. The comparison of
the estimated abilities shows that Federer’s and Murray’s chance of winning
Wimbledon 2009 was overestimated by the bookmakers after Nadal’s with-
drawal. Furthermore, we use all estimated abilities to simulate the outcome
of three different tournament designs, showing that in the long run the seed-
ing has not that much influence and a round-robin tournament would be
more favorable to top players than the origin single elimination tournament.
In the last application we extend the framework for modeling bookmak-
ers odds to a more general model class. Based on bookmakers odds for
the occurrence of a set of events (e.g., players/teams winning a particular
match/tournament), a natural strategy for the computation of consensus
and (dis)agreement are event-specific means and variances across the differ-
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ent bookmakers. The statistical modeling framework outlined above contains
this strategy as a special case –namely fixed event effects for both means and
variances – but also allows exploration of a wider range of model specifi-
cations. For example, potential advantages of random vs. fixed effects can
be investigated, or effects pertaining to the bookmaker, grouping effects for
the different events, or associations between means and variances can be
exploited to specify more parsimonious models. In the application to the
UEFA Champions League 2008/09, it can be shown that the straightforward
strategy of event-specific means (also used above for the UEFA EUR 2008
and Wimbledon 2009) and variances performs well in a wide range of models.
However it can be improved even further when the association between means
and variances is incorporated, i.e., when considering that events with higher
probability of occurrence also have a higher level of agreement. The result-
ing bookmaker consensus forecast for the UEFA Champions League 2008/09
performs well in practice, exhibiting a high correlation with the actual tour-
nament outcome.
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Computational details
All computations were carried out in the R system (version 2.8.1) for sta-
tistical computing (R Development Core Team, 2009). In particular, the
R package nlme version 3.1-90 (Pinheiro et al., 2008) was used for the max-
imum likelihood estimation of the mixed-effects models (see Pinheiro and
Bates, 2000) and the R-package rjags version 1.0.3-5 (Plummer, 2009) was
used for the Bayesian estimation of the dynamic latent trait model.
We also employ so-called relationship plots to visualize the estimated rating
bias and error variance parameters. These plots use the strucplot framework
according to Meyer et al. (2006) and the corresponding strucplot function of
the R package vcd (Meyer et al., 2008) to visualize the relationship between
measurements of a quantitative variable (here: estimated model parameters)
and the interaction of two qualitative factors (here: industry/bank combina-
tions). Each combination of factor levels is represented by a rectangular cell
shaded by gray values representing the corresponding measurement values.
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